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No previous studies had examined how all constructs of executive functioning (i.e., 
conflict inhibition, delay inhibition, cognitive flexibility, and working memory) relate 
to memory for contextual details and false recognition in early childhood controlling 
for general intelligence. Three and six-year-old children performed a laboratory-based 
episodic memory task and a battery of neuropsychological tasks. The relation 
between executive functioning and false recognition was diminished taking general 
intellectual ability into account. Executive functioning did not predict memory for 
contextual details in the full sample. However, when children who were at chance at 
recalling contextual details were excluded from analysis, executive functioning 
showed a trend for accounting for variance beyond age group and general intellectual 
 
ability. The inability of this effect to reach conventional statistical significance was 
likely due low statistical power resulting from the sample size reduction. Specifically, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Episodic memories, a type of explicit memory, are memories for events. Episodic 
memories are rich with contextual details including the “who, what, where, when, 
why, and how of experience (Bauer, 2006).” These types of memories are central to 
our sense of personal identity because they constitute our knowledge of the world, 
document our unique pasts, and influence our future actions, cognitions, and 
emotions. Early childhood is a period of significant development in episodic memory. 
Specifically, children’s memory improves as they are better (a) able to recall 
contextual details associated with objects and events and (b) resist falsely identifying 
novel information as previously encountered (i.e., false recognition; Baker-Ward, 
Gordon, Ornstein, Larus, & Clubb, 1993; Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Lindsay, 
Johnson, & Kwon, 1991; Lloyd, Doydum, & Newcombe, 2009; Picard, Cousin, 
Guillery-Girard, Eustache, & Piolino, 2012; Pillemer, Picariello, & Pruett, 1994; 
Riggins, Miller, Bauer, Georgieff, & Nelson, 2009; Sluzenski, Newcombe, & Kovacs, 
2006).  
 These developments are likely the result of multiple sources of developmental 
change. One of these sources is neural development in brain regions known to support 
memory encoding and retrieval in adults (i.e., the hippocampus, a region of the 
medial temporal lobe (MTL), and the prefrontal cortex (PFC); Bauer, 2006; 
Cycowicz, Friedman, Snodgrass, & Duff, 2001; Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Ofen 
et al., 2007; Yonelinas, 2002).  For example, the PFC is related to memory for 
contextual details and false recognition in adults (Yonelinas, 2002).  In particular, 




damage to one particular subregion of the PFC (i.e., the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) leads to performance deficits on memory for contextual details and 
increases false recognition (Farovik, Dupont, Arce, & Eichenbaum, 2008; Kopelman, 
Stanhope, & Kingsley, 1997). The PFC (including DLPFC) undergoes significant 
developmental change during early childhood. This has been demonstrated by at least 
two metrics: neuroanatomical evidence (e.g., number of cells and synaptic 
connections) and marker tasks Marker tasks are assessments assumed to tap the 
functioning of particular brain regions. Support for which brain region is recruited on 
a given task stems from activation of that region during the task by typical adults and 
deficits on those tasks by patients with lesions to that region (see Diamond, 2002, for 
a review).  
Marker tasks are particularly useful in developmental populations as they 
provide one of the only ways to assess the functionality of brain regions during early 
childhood (de Haan & Johnson, 2003). Executive function tasks serve as marker tasks 
for prefrontal functioning. These tasks measure effortful goal-directed cognitive 
operations including inhibition, cognitive flexibility, and working memory (Diamond, 
2006; Zelazo, Carlson, & Kesek, 2008). Both inhibition, specifically conflict 
inhibition, and cognitive flexibility require the DLPFC in adults, the region 
implicated in memory for contextual details and false recognition (Berlin, Rolls, & 
Kischka, 2004; Farovik et al., 2008; Kopelman et al., 1997). Therefore, I 
hypothesized that tasks of conflict inhibition and cognitive flexibility would be 
related to memory for contextual details and false recognition in early childhood. 




Evidence for this association has been found in school age children (Cycowicz 
et al., 2001; Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Picard et al., 2012; Ruffman, Rustin, 
Garnham, & Parkin, 2001) and normal aging. For example, studies in aging have 
found that better executive functioning is positively related to memory for contextual 
details (Craik, Morris, Morris & Loewen, 1990; Fabiani & Friedman, 1996; Glisky, 
Polster, & Routhieux, 1995) and resistance to false recognition (McCabe, Roediger, 
McDaniel, & Balota, 2009).  In young adult populations the influence of executive 
functioning on memory for contextual details and false recognition is less well 
supported, perhaps suggesting maturational stability (Manning, Gordon, Pearlson, & 
Schretlen, 2007). Taken together, these findings suggest that executive functioning 
may specifically influence memory for contextual details and false recognition during 
the development and decline of executive functioning. 
To date, no studies have systematically examined how all three constructs of 
executive functioning (i.e., inhibition, cognitive flexibility, and working memory) are 
related to memory for contextual details and false recognition in early childhood. This 
represents a critical period of investigation because conflict inhibition and cognitive 
flexibility show abrupt improvement between 3 and 6 years of age (Crammond, 1992; 
Diamond, 2006; Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008; Luciana & Nelson, 2002, Menna, 
1989; Zelazo et al., 2008). Additionally, this is the same developmental period during 
which memory for contextual details and false recognition improves substantially 
(Baker-Ward et al., 1993; Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Lindsay et al., 1991; Lloyd 
et al., 2009; Picard et al., 2012; Pillemer et al., 1994; Riggins et al., 2009; Sluzenski 
et al., 2006).  




Therefore, the aim of the proposed study was to assess how constructs of 
executive functioning are related to memory for contextual details and false 
recognition in 3- and 6-year-olds, while taking into account general intelligence. I 
expected that, due to the recruitment of the DLPFC, performance on cognitive 
flexibility and conflict inhibition tasks would be specifically related to memory for 
contextual details and false recognition whereas other aspects of executive 
functioning (i.e., working memory and delay inhibition) would not. 
Development of Episodic Memory  
Initial forms of episodic memory are present in infancy (see Bauer, 2004, for a 
review). However, research using diverse methods has shown that marked 
improvement occurs during early childhood. Specifically, advances are present both 
in children’s ability to remember contextual details and to resist false recognition 
(Baker-Ward et al., 1993; Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Lindsay et al., 1991; Lloyd 
et al., 2009; Picard et al., 2012; Pillemer et al., 1994; Riggins et al., 2009; Sluzenski 
et al., 2006). Memory for contextual details refers to memory for information 
associated with studied items or events whereas false recognition refers to the 
acceptance of novel information as previously encountered. In order to understand the 
development of episodic memory, researchers have begun to use paradigms that allow 
for the objective assessment of children’s accuracy for events and their associated 
details to examine these developmental changes. 
Memory for contextual details.  When word cues are used to prompt 
memories by older children and adults, the number of memories they are able to 
recall increases substantially throughout the childhood years (Larkina & Bauer, 2011; 




Rubin and Schulkind, 1997). In support of this finding, a longitudinal study by 
Pillemer and colleagues (1994) assessed memory for a unique event to determine age-
related changes in memory retrieval. The researchers interviewed 3- and 4-year-old 
children following an emergency preschool evacuation at two time points.  No 
differences in memory recall were present 2 weeks after the event. However, 7 years 
following the event, children who were 4-years-old during the time of the event freely 
recalled significantly more details about the emergency than 3-year-old children. This 
study suggested that even though young children are able to encode and describe 
events in detail, age-related differences in memory processes influence long-term 
memory for events. However, recall paradigms such as the one just described may 
underestimate children’s memory for events due to age-related differences in 
language ability and narration style (Bauer, 2006; Hamond & Fivush, 1991). 
To limit the constraints of language ability on memory assessment 
performance, researchers often employ association paradigms. Association paradigms 
require participants to pair items with contextual details. Then, behavioral responses 
are used as indices of memory performance. Research utilizing association paradigms 
supports a differential increase in children’s memory for contextual details compared 
to item memory between 3 and 6 years of age (Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; 
Lindsay et al., 1991; Lloyd et al., 2009; Riggins et al., 2009; Sluzenski et al., 2006). 
To assess developmental changes related to memory for temporal relations, Riggins 
and colleagues (2009) utilized a modified elicited imitation paradigm commonly used 
in infancy research (see Bauer, 2006 for a review). Children learned themed event 
sequences. Then, item memory was assessed by the performance of individual actions 




(e.g., trying to catch the fish) whereas contextual memory was determined by the 
number of temporal relations recalled (e.g., baiting the hook then catching the fish). 
The investigation revealed that item memory was similar between 3- and 4-year-olds 
but that 4-year-olds recalled significantly more temporal relations.  
Children’s memory for the source of learned information has also been shown 
to improve in early childhood (Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Lindsay et al., 1991). 
To determine the depth of children’s deficits in retrieving contextual details, 
Drummey and Newcombe (2002) used an open-ended response paradigm. Children 
4-, 6-, and 8-years-old were taught novel facts in the laboratory by a puppet or 
experimenter. During retrieval a week later, children were asked to freely recall fact 
knowledge and fact source, measures of item and context memory, respectively. If the 
fact or associated source was incorrect, forced-choice follow-up questions were 
administered. The results suggested that fact knowledge increased incrementally from 
4 to 8 years but fact source specifically increased between 4 and 6 years.  
Similar contextual memory transitions between 4- and 6-year-olds have been 
documented by assessing children’s memory for item combinations (Lloyd et al., 
2009; Sluzenski et al., 2006). Sluzenski and colleagues (2006) found that 4-year-old 
children had poorer memory performance for item and background combinations in 
comparison to 6-year-olds. The data analysis method used in that study did not allow 
for the differentiation of whether older children were better at identifying 
combinations or whether younger children falsely accepted novel combinations as 
old, a form of false recognition.  




False recognition. To address this question, Lloyd and colleagues (2009) 
used a similar paradigm in a subsequent study. When accurate item combination 
recognition and false recognition of new combinations were assessed separately, 4-
year-olds incorrectly accepted more novel item and background pairings than 6-year-
olds (Lloyd et al., 2009). However, 4-year-olds recognized previously studied pairs as 
well as 6-year-olds. This suggests that 4-year-olds may rely on a sense of stimulus 
familiarity rather than specific details when making recognition judgments about 
items.   
Two additional studies provide support that younger children are particularly 
susceptible to instances of false recognition.   Baker-Ward and colleagues assessed 3-, 
5-, and 7-year-old children’s memory following a routine visit to the doctor (Baker-
Ward et al., 1993). During interviewing, 3-year-old children were more likely than 5- 
and 7-year-old children to accept that events which did not happen during their visit 
occurred. This effect was present for routine check-up related events their nurse did 
not perform (e.g., “Did the nurse give you a shot?”) and non-check-up related events 
(e.g., “Did the nurse cut your hair?”). Likewise, in another study 4- and 6-year-old 
children listened to stories and were presented with questions about details that were 
either thematically similar or dissimilar to the story (Lindsay et al., 1991). Younger 
children were more likely than older children and adults to accept novel but 
thematically associated details as previously heard. These studies suggest that 3- and 
4-year-olds are more susceptible to false recognition in comparison to older children, 
particularly when the distractor items are similar to previously encoded events.  




Taking together, studies on the development of episodic memory have shown 
that children’s memory for contextual details and ability to resist false recognition 
show significant improvement in early childhood.  
What develops? Multiple sources of developmental change potentially 
contribute to advances in children’s episodic memory (see Bauer, 2006, for a review). 
These sources include skills that are tangential to memory as well as maturation of 
brain structures that subserve memory processes. Each of these factors is described 
below.  
Many abilities develop in early childhood and scaffold the structure of 
children’s episodic memories, some of which include language, the concept of time, 
and theory of mind. The development of language and narrative skills plays a crucial 
role in memory retention (Bauer, 2006).  For example, Peterson and Rideout (1998) 
demonstrated that young children with narrative skills when they visited an 
emergency room were more likely to remember the event than non-narrative children. 
Understanding the concepts of time and self may also bolster children’s episodic 
memories by allowing them to organize events sequentially and relate them to the self 
(Bauer, 2006). Similarly, theory of mind, the understanding of others’ desires and 
knowledge, may also help children recall events (Bright-Paul, Jarrold, & Wright, 
2008; Welch-Ross, Diecidue, & Miller, 1997). Theory of mind understanding may 
structure events causally and provide children with an understanding about what 
information should be provided to others to fill gaps in their knowledge.  
Specifically related to memory performance, children’s increased abilities on 
memory tasks may improve due to developments in the processes of memory 




encoding, consolidation, storage, and retrieval. The increased proficiency of these 
processes across development has been attributed to the development of the MTL and 
PFC regions (see Bauer, 2006 for a review; Cycowicz et al., 2001; Drummey & 
Newcombe, 2002; Ghetti, DeMaster, Yonelinas, & Bunge, 2010; Ofen et al., 2007). 
Although most regions of the MTL become functionally mature by the second 
postnatal year, the dentate gyrus, a region of the hippocampus, follows an extended 
developmental trajectory (Eckenhoff & Rakic, 1991). The hippocampus is required 
for memory formation, and anatomical studies with nonhuman primates suggest that 
the synaptic density of the dentate gyrus peaks during the second year but that 
synaptic pruning continues until at least 4 to 5 years (Eckenhoff & Rakic, 1991; 
Gabrieli, Cohen, & Corkin, 1988; Goldman-Rakic, 1987). In fact, recent functional 
neuroimaging evidence suggests that the medial temporal system continues 
developing even into adolescence (Ghetti et al., 2010). The prolonged developmental 
trajectory of the hippocampus specifically influences memory for contextual 
information since items and their contexts have been hypothesized to bind within the 
hippocampus (Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Eichenbaum, Yonelinas, & 
Ranganath, 2007). Given the developmental trajectory of the hippocampus along with 
its role in processing contextual details, neural development of the hippocampus may 
underlie the documented performance improvement on associative memory 
paradigms in early childhood.  
 Maturation of the PFC may also contribute to children’s improved memory 
for contextual details and resistance to false recognition since this region has been 
shown to be related to these constructs in adults (Yonelinas, 2002).  As with the 




hippocampus, the PFC shows an extended developmental trajectory with pruning 
continuing until early adulthood. However, significant reductions in neuronal and 
synaptic density occur in the PFC between 2 and 7 years of age, the same time frame 
when children’s memory for contextual details and resistance to false recognition 
improve (Diamond, 2002; Huttenlocher, 1990).  
Diana and colleagues’ (2007) binding of item and context model provides 
support for the role of the PFC in memory for contextual details. The perirhinal and 
parahippocampal cortices, regions of the MTL hypothesized to underlie memory for 
items and contexts, respectively, receive projections from functionally distinct neural 
regions (Diana et al., 2007; Suzuki & Amaral, 1994). The perirhinal cortex primarily 
receives input from unimodal visual association areas although weaker connections 
are present between this region and the insula, orbitofrontal cortex, and 
parahippocampal cortex (Suzuki & Amaral, 1994). Conversely, the parahippocampal 
cortex receives its strongest projections from the polymodal sensory association 
areas, the parietal cortex, insula, cingulate cortex, and DLPFC (Suzuki & Amaral, 
1994). Since the parahippocampal cortex receives strong input from the DLPFC, 
memory for contextual details may be particularly influenced by maturation of this 
region and in the strengthening of connections between the DLPFC and 
parahippocampal cortex.  
Although the neural substrates underlying false recognition are not as well 
defined, resistance to false recognition may also be influenced by the development of 
the DLPFC since this region has been implicated in adult neuroimaging and lesion 
studies as discussed below. Therefore, development of the PFC, specifically the 




DLPFC, may contribute to the documented increases in children’s memory for 
contextual details and resistance to false recognition. This relation is supported by 
research in adults with evidence from neuroimaging, lesion, and aging studies. 
Relation between Memory and Prefrontal Functioning in Adults 
Memory for contextual details. In adults neuroimaging studies support the 
active engagement of the PFC during memory encoding and retrieval (Cabeza & 
Nyberg, 2000; Yonelinas, 2002). Prefrontal activation is commonly reported during 
associative memory tasks that require memory for contextual details surrounding an 
event (Cansino, Maquet, Dolan, & Rugg, 2002; Kirwan, Wixted, & Squire, 2008; 
Slotnick, Moo, Segal, & Hart, 2003). However, determining which specific regions of 
PFC are involved for memory of contextual details is currently a topic of empirical 
inquiry. 
The role of the PFC in memory for contextual details is further supported by 
lesion studies. Patients with lesions to the PFC exhibit deficits in memory for 
contextual details (Duarte, Ranganath, & Knight, 2005; Janowsky, Shimamura, & 
Squire, 1989; Jurado, Junque, Pujol, Oliver, & Vendrell, 1997; Kopelman et al., 1997; 
Shimamura, Janowsky, & Squire, 1990).  Prefrontal lobe patients have been shown to 
have poorer memory for temporal order (Shimamura et al., 1990), frequency 
estimations (Jurado et al., 1997), task performed at encoding (Duarte et al., 2005), 
and the source of learned information (Janowsky et al., 1989). Few studies have 
assessed the role of focal prefrontal lesions to determine the influence of specific 
regions on memory performance. However, one study found that lesions of the 
DLPFC impaired memory for contextual details whereas lesions to other regions of 




the PFC did not (Kopelman et al., 1997). Thus, convergent evidence from 
neuroimaging and lesion studies suggests that the PFC is implicated in memory for 
contextual details. 
False recognition. In addition to memory for contextual details, resistance to 
false recognition has also been shown to require the PFC, specifically DLPFC. An 
fMRI study revealed that DLPFC was recruited more during a novelty assessment 
paradigm than an associative memory task supporting the role of this region in 
recognizing new items (Dobbins et al., unpublished data as discussed in Dobbins, 
Simons, & Schacter, 2004). Moreover, Rossi and colleagues (2001) showed that 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over right DLPFC led to an increase in false 
recognition during a picture recognition paradigm.  
Lesion studies further support the role of the DLPFC in false recognition.  A 
number of patients with prefrontal damage have been shown to falsely recognize 
novel stimuli and attribute high confidence ratings to these judgments (Schacter, 
Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998). Some research suggests that the DLPFC may 
specifically play an important role in false recognition. Compared to controls and 
patients with lesions to other regions of the PFC, patients with lesions to the left 
DLPFC were twice as likely to misidentify novel words as previously viewed on a 
word recognition task (Alexander, Stuss & Fansabedian, 2003; although see Schacter, 
Curran, Galluccio, Milberg, & Bates, 1996 for increased false recognition following 
damage to the right hemisphere). Consistent with this finding, lesions to the rat 
medial PFC, a region hypothesized to be functionally homologous to human DLPFC, 
led to false recognition of novel stimuli (Farovik et al., 2008).   




In sum, the PFC, specifically the DLPFC, is implicated in processing memory 
for contextual details and false recognition in adults. In addition to neuroimaging and 
lesion studies, marker tasks have been instrumental in revealing how the functioning 
of the prefrontal cortex is related to memory for contextual details and false 
recognition.  
Executive Functioning 
Marker tasks are child-appropriate versions of neuropsychological 
assessments shown to be dependent on specific brain regions in adults (see de Haan & 
Johnson, 2003 for discussion of marker tasks). As Zelazo and colleagues (2008) have 
argued, functioning of the PFC, although not synonymous with executive functioning, 
is central during the implementation of executive functions. Executive functions are a 
set of effortful goal-directed cognitive operations (Best, Miller, & Jones, 2009; 
Diamond, 2006). Inhibition, cognitive flexibility, and working memory are the core 
components of executive functioning and support higher order cognitive processing 
such as problem solving, planning, and decision making (Diamond, 2006). Inhibition 
refers to ignoring distracting information or resisting a dominant response. Cognitive 
flexibility is the ability to switch attention, cognitions, or behaviors. Working 
memory involves maintaining and fluidly employing information. Because the PFC is 
recruited during inhibition, cognitive flexibility, and working memory tasks, 
performance on such tasks may be used as an index of prefrontal functioning. 
Evidence for the influence of executive functioning on memory for contextual details 
and false recognition has been shown in school-aged children and normal aging.  




Associations between executive function and memory in adults. Studies in 
normal aging populations show that memory for contextual details and resistance to 
false recognition decreases markedly with age (Craik et al., 1990; Fabiani & 
Friedman, 1996; Glisky et al., 1995; McIntyre & Craik, 1987; Norman & Schacter, 
1997; Parkin, Walter, & Hunkin, 1995; Spencer & Raz, 1995). Performance deficits 
may be due to age-related declines in the functioning of the PFC due to decreases in 
prefrontal white and gray matter (O’Sullivan et al., 2001; Raz et al., 1997). 
Neuropsychological studies support this notion by showing that executive functioning 
is positively related to memory for contextual details and resistance to false 
recognition.  
Many aging studies document a positive relation between performance on 
associative memory and executive function tasks (Craik et al., 1990; Fabiani & 
Friedman, 1996; Glisky et al., 1995). Source and recency judgments are related to 
performance on the Wisconsin Card Sort Task (WCST), a task assumed to require 
inhibition, cognitive flexibility, and working memory (Craik et al., 1990; Fabiani & 
Friedman, 1996). Similarly, Glisky and colleagues (1995) found that older adults who 
displayed higher executive functioning judged source more accurately. These results 
jointly support the notion that age-related decrements in executive functioning are 
related to memory for contextual details.  
In contrast to the research with older adults, an extensive literature search 
revealed only one study conducted with younger adults that assessed the relation 
between memory for contextual details and executive functioning (Manning et al., 
2007). This study provided only weak evidence for a relation between recency 




judgments and executive functioning. This suggests that executive functioning may 
specifically influence memory for contextual details during the development and 
decline of executive functioning. 
Fewer studies have assessed how executive functioning is related to false 
recognition. McCabe and colleagues (2009) documented a relation between executive 
functioning and false recognition in 18-90-year-old adults. Path analysis revealed that 
false recognition was related to marker tasks of PFC but not MTL functioning 
whereas accurate subjective recollection was related to marker tasks of MTL but not 
PFC functioning. This study provides support for a relation between executive 
functioning and false recognition. However, this study did not investigate whether the 
relation differed across development.  
Collectively these studies suggest that executive functioning influences 
memory for contextual details and false recognition in adult populations, particularly 
in aging. Analogous to the relation between executive functioning and memory for 
contextual details in aging populations, the influence of executive functioning on 
memory for contextual details and false recognition may be robust in early childhood 
when executive functioning shows  significant development. 
Development of executive functioning. Inhibition and cognitive flexibility 
show abrupt improvement in the preschool years, particularly after the age of 3 
(Diamond, 2006; Garon et al., 2008; Zelazo et al., 2008). Carlson and Moses (2001) 
differentiated between inhibition tasks that require delayed versus conflicting 
responses. Whereas delayed tasks primarily recruit the orbitofrontal cortex, conflict 
tasks require activation of lateral regions, such as the DLPFC (Berlin et al., 2004). 




The orbitofrontal cortex and DLPFC reach functional maturity at different rates. 
Adult levels of gray matter volume are reached sequentially for the orbitofrontal, 
ventrolateral, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (Giedd et al., 1999). Thus, optimal 
performance on tasks recruiting those regions is likely reached at different time 
points.  
Consistent with this supposition, many studies have failed to find age-related 
differences on assessments of delayed inhibition, such as the delay of gratification 
task (Carlson, 2005; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Most studies that have 
examined delayed inhibition consider individual differences in performance rather 
than the developmental trajectory of this ability. However, conflict inhibition 
improves suddenly between 3 and 6 years of age on tasks such as the day/night 
Stroop task (Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994) and grass/snow task (Carlson & 
Moses, 2001; Carlson, 2005). Such tasks require the inhibition of a prepotent 
response in favor of a conflicting response rather than the delay of a typical response. 
For example, during the grass/snow task children must point to a green stimulus when 
the experimenter says “snow” and to a white stimulus when the experimenter says 
“grass” (Carlson & Moses, 2001). 
 Cognitive flexibility also increases substantially in early childhood as 
illustrated by children’s abilities to use a new set of rules (Carlson, 2005; see Zelazo 
& Jacque, 1997, for a review) or take a novel perspective (Gopnik & Rosati, 2001; 
Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). For example, during the dimensional change 
card sort (DCCS) task children must sort two types of target cards by one dimension 
(i.e., color; Zelazo, Resnick, & Piñon, 1995). Then, children are asked to sort by 




another dimension (i.e., shape). Generally, 3-year-old children perseverate and 
continue to sort by the original dimension, 4-year-olds switch more readily, and 5-
year-olds perform optimally (Zelazo, 2006; Zelazo et al., 1995). This effect is present 
regardless of the dimension enacted first, and working memory demands associated 
with this task are minimal since sorting instructions are presented for every trial. 
Diamond (2006) explained that “once a child of 3 years has focused on the ‘redness’ 
of a red truck, it is difficult for the child to switch mindsets and focus on its 
‘truckness (pp. 81).’”  
In opposition to the prominent developmental advances on conflict inhibition 
and cognitive flexibility tasks, working memory develops gradually. Performance on 
working memory tasks, such as spatial or digit span tasks, linearly increases from the 
preschool years into adolescence (Crammond, 1992; Diamond, 2006; Luciana & 
Nelson, 2002; Menna, 1989).  Collectively, this research suggests that significant 
developments in executive functioning occur in early childhood for the domains of 
conflict inhibition and cognitive flexibility whereas working memory performance 
increases incrementally. Since prominent developments are present in the domains of 
conflict inhibition and cognitive flexibility, when advances are seen in children’s 
memory for contextual details and false recognition, relations may be present between 
these constructs. Furthermore, conflict inhibition and cognitive flexibility likely 
require DLPFC functioning, the same region implicated in memory for contextual 
details and false recognition. 
Associations between memory and executive functioning in children. 
Developmental researchers have begun to examine the relation between executive 




functioning and memory in childhood (Cycowicz et al., 2001; Drummey & 
Newcombe, 2002; Picard et al., 2012; Ruffman et al., 2001). Memory for contextual 
details and false recognition are related to measures of executive functioning 
(Cycowicz et al., 2001; Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Picard et al., 2012; Ruffman 
et al., 2001). Picard and colleagues (2012) recently found that for 4-16-year-olds 
executive functioning skills, as indexed by updating, cognitive flexibility, and conflict 
inhibition tasks, predicted memory for spatial and temporal information. Cognitive 
flexibility was most related to memory for these contextual details. In contrast, item 
recognition was solely accounted for by feature binding abilities.  
Similarly, in a sample of 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds Ruffman and colleagues 
(2001) found a relation between conflict inhibition, as measured by performance on a 
Stroop task, and two measures of memory performance. Children with better 
inhibitory abilities were more likely to remember the source of learned information 
and less likely to falsely recognize new information as old. However, working 
memory performance, as assessed by a digit span task, was indiscriminately related to 
memory performance. Working memory was related to both the identification of 
items as old and correct source judgments.  This research suggests that inhibition may 
specifically contribute to memory for contextual details and false recognition whereas 
working memory supports memory more generally. 
 The majority of research examining how executive functioning influences 
false recognition has been conducted by determining the relations between executive 
functioning and suggestibility. Although not synonymous with false recognition, 
suggestibility is closely related. Suggestibility refers to the acceptance of information 




as belonging to the original encoding experience although it was encountered after 
initial learning. A few developmental studies have reported a relation between 
increased inhibitory control and resistance to suggestibility in early childhood 
(Melinder, Endestad, & Magnussen, 2006; Roberts & Powell, 2005). Although 
working memory and inhibition skills have been associated with false recognition, to 
my knowledge, no research has assessed whether the third core component of 
executive function, cognitive flexibility, is related to false recognition. 
 Some recent research has begun to assess how executive functioning, is 
related to memory for contextual details and false recognition utilizing associative 
memory paradigms. In a study of children 4-, 6-, and 8-years-old, researchers 
assessed memory for the source of learned information and how memory was related 
to performance on a two executive function tasks, a child friendly version of the 
WCST and the day/night task (Diamond & Boyer, 1988; Drummey & Newcombe, 
2002; Gerstadt et al., 1994).  The WCST and day/night tasks require a combination of 
working memory and inhibitory control. Although fact memory improved for each 
age group, memory for source specifically increased between 4 and 6 years of age. 
Controlling for general intellectual ability, 4-year-old children who performed better 
on the WCST were less likely to judge learning information from an extraneous 
source outside the experimental paradigm (Drummey & Newcombe, 2002). The 
inclusion of general intellectual ability dampened the relation between verbal fluency 
and extra-experimenter errors. This finding suggests that some executive function-
episodic memory relations may be influenced by general intellectual ability. Since 
only 4-year-old children completed measures of general intellectual ability, the 




relation between memory for contextual details and executive function controlling for 
intelligence were unable to be completed for the older age groups. This study also 
suggests that false recognition may be related to inhibition in young children. The 
inability of this study to discern a relation between memory performance and the 
day/night task, a task classically used with preschoolers as a measure of inhibition, 
may be because the children were 4-years-old. Significant improvements on this task 
occur between 3 and 4 years of age with 6-year-old children performing at ceiling on 
this task (Diamond, 2006).  
A similar inability to discern a relation between conflict inhibition and 
memory was reported by Roberts and Powell (2005) in which only one out of four 
measures of inhibition was related to suggestibility. As with the Drummey and 
Newcombe (2002) study, the additional three measures used by Roberts and Powell 
(2005) may have been inappropriate due to the age of the participants. As discussed 
by Roberts and Powell (2005), the children in their sample performed at high levels 
which may have masked a relation between performance on the executive function 
tasks and suggestibility. These findings illustrate the importance of selecting 
executive function measures that are sensitive to the cognitive capacities of the 
participants.  
 A relation between inhibition and memory for contextual details has also been 
discerned in school aged children (Cycowicz et al., 2001). Memory for the color of 
previously viewed line drawings was assessed in 7- to 8-year-old children and adults. 
Performance increases with age were observed in participants’ memory for items and 
their color. More pronounced improvements were detected for memory of the 




contextual detail rather than the individual items. This study discerned a relation 
between source accuracy and a competing programs task, a measure of conflict 
inhibition. All together, these studies suggest that select measures of executive 
functioning may be related to memory for contextual details and false recognition.  
Current Study 
The aim of the current study was to examine how the core components of 
executive function were related to memory for contextual details and false 
recognition. Furthermore, this study examined if these relations were no longer 
present after controlling for general intellectual ability. Three- and 6-year-old 
children participated given that significant improvements in the executive function 
domains of conflict inhibition and cognitive flexibility occur between these ages 
(Diamond, 2006; Zelazo et al., 2008). Similarly, previous research shows that 
although young children have similar levels of accuracy for item memory, memory 
for contextual and resistance to false recognition increases during early childhood 
(Lloyd et al., 2009; Riggins et al., 2009; Sluzenski et al., 2006).  
Children performed a laboratory-based associative memory paradigm 
designed to resemble the rich episodic memories of children’s daily lives. 6-year-old 
children were expected to more accurately identify previously viewed items and 
contextual details in comparison to 3-year-old children (Drummey & Newcombe, 
2002; Riggins et al., 2009; Sluzenski et al., 2006). Additionally, I hypothesized that 
6-year-olds would falsely recognize fewer novel items (Lloyd et al., 2009).  
Children also completed a battery of executive function measures examining 
conflict inhibition, delay inhibition, cognitive flexibility, and working memory. 




Specific relations were expected between memory and executive function measures 
due to previous developmental, neuroanatomical, gerontological, and lesion studies. 
Children’s memory for contextual details and false recognition were expected to be 
related to measures of conflict inhibition and cognitive flexibility, as assessed by the 
day/night and DCCS tasks (Cycowicz et al., 2001, Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; 
Passler, Isaac, & Hynd, 1985; Suzuki & Amaral, 1994; Zelazo, 2006). This relation 
was expected since the DLPFC is implicated in memory for contextual details, false 
recognition, conflict inhibition, and cognitive flexibility (Farovik et al., 2008; 
Kopelman et al., 1997; Berlin et al., 2004). However, memory for contextual details 
and false recognition were not expected to be related to delay inhibition or working 
memory, as assessed by the delay of gratification and digit span tasks (Ruffman et al., 
2001; Zelazo et al., 2008). Based on the finding by Drummey & Newcombe (2002) 
that when general intelligence was accounted for in a sample of 4-year-olds the 
relations between memory and executive functioning differed, the current study also 
assessed how general intellectual ability influenced the relations between executive 
functioning and memory constructs. I hypothesized that general intellectual ability 
would not influence the relations between executive functioning, memory for 
contextual details, and false recognition. Whether these relations differed as a 
function of age was also examined. The current literature was insufficient to 
formulate a specific hypothesis about whether the relation between executive function 
and memory would exhibit an age-related difference. Since executive functioning 
continues to develop into adolescence the relation could have been similar across age 
groups (Luciana & Nelson, 2002). However, since 3-year-olds in particular exhibit 




deficits on executive function tasks compared to older children, the relation between 
memory and executive function could differ (Diamond, 2006; Zelazo et al., 2008).  
Contributions to Current Literature 
 The proposed study significantly contributes to current knowledge in three 
separate ways. First, the influence of executive functioning on memory for contextual 
details and false recognition in 3-year-old children represents a critical gap in the 
literature. Although Drummey & Newcombe (2002) targeted 3-year-old children as 
an age group of interest due to profound deficits on executive function tasks, they 
conducted their study with 4- and 6-year-old children.  
 In addition to assessing these two age groups of theoretical interest, the 
current study provides a systematic assessment of executive functioning. Previous 
studies interested in the relation between memory and executive function have not 
assessed all of the core executive functions including inhibition, cognitive flexibility, 
and working memory (Cycowicz et al., 2001; Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; 
Ruffman et al., 2001; cf. Picard et al., 2012). The current study included assessments 
that measured each of these constructs.  
Finally, this study allowed for the assessment of how executive functioning is 
related to memory for contextual details and false recognition independent of general 
intellectual ability for both 3- and 6-year-olds. Drummey & Newcombe (2002) 
showed that controlling for general intellectual ability influences the relation between 
memory and executive function (Drummey & Newcombe, 2002). Altogether, this 
study fulfills three major gaps in the current literature by (a) recruiting 3- and 6-year-




old children, (b) assessing working memory, cognitive flexibility, and inhibition, and 
(c) controlling for general intellectual ability.   
Chapter 2: Methods 
Participants 
 Participants were recruited from a database maintained by the University of 
Maryland Infant and Child Studies Consortium. The current study was cross-sectional 
and included 19 3-year-olds (6 females, M = 3.26, range 3.05 – 3.47 years) and 19 6-
year-olds (10 females, M = 6.22, range 6.0 – 6.52 years). The sample included 2 
Asian, 5 Black/African American, 7 multiracial, 19 White/Caucasian, and 5 Hispanic 
children. An additional 21 participants were excluded from participation due to non-
compliancy (n = 8 3-year-olds, n = 1 6-year-old), equipment failure (n =1 3-year-old), 
and failures to meet language criteria (n = 1 3-year-old), full term criteria (n = 2 6-
year-olds), complete all three behavioral sessions (n = 5 3-year-olds, n = 1 6-year-
old), and an inability to understand task instructions (n = 1 3-year-old), and missing 
behavioral data from 1 assessment (n = 1). Children included in the current sample 
did not differ from those excluded from their own age group in age or gender. Parents 
provided informed consent for their children, and the study was ended if children 
verbally dissented. Children received a small toy after each session and a certificate 
for participation. 
Stimuli 
 Behavioral stimuli for the memory paradigm included 81 age-appropriate, 
store-bought items (i.e., a book about lions and a policeman’s hat). Each item was 




visually distinct and identified with a unique verbal label. Additionally, each stimulus 
was associated with one of three novel actions (i.e., each item was either placed the 
head, drummed on, or hugged). Actions attributed to stimuli were selected to be novel 
in that they were typically not associated with that stimulus (i.e., the policeman’s hat 
would not be placed on my head). The items were separated into nine sets of nine 
items, and each action was performed three times per set.  
Procedures 
This study included two components, an experimental memory paradigm and 
a battery of neuropsychological assessments. The study took place over three visits at 
the Neurocognitive Development Lab. During the first session which lasted 
approximately 1 hour, children encoded information for the memory task and 
completed the Receptive Vocabulary assessment. Children completed the retrieval 
portion of the memory task during the second session 24 to 48 hours later. There was 
no difference in the average delay for 3-year-old (M = 1.2 days) and 6-year-old 
children (M = 1.26 days), t(36) = -.37, p = .71. The retrieval portion assessed 
children’s memory for individual items and their associated contextual details. This 
session lasted approximately 1.5 hours. During the third session children completed a 
battery of neuropsychological assessments measuring general intellectual ability, 
memory, and executive functioning.  The third session occurred within 3 weeks of the 
second session and lasted approximately 1 hour. There was no difference in the 
average delay for 3-year-old (M = 6.11 days) and 6-year-old children (M = 6.37 
days), t(36) = -.31, p = .76. All procedures were approved by the University of 




Maryland Institutional Review Board prior to the beginning of the study (see 
Appendix A). 
Memory paradigm. 
  Encoding. Children were not informed that their memory would be 
subsequently measured to reduce age-related differences in strategy use (Siegler & 
Alibali, 2005). During encoding each child was introduced to two different locations 
and a distinct character that “belonged” in that location. Three sets of nine items were 
presented in each location for a total of 27 items viewed per location. Order of set 
presentation was counterbalanced between participants at encoding and randomly 
presented at retrieval to reduce the likelihood of memory effects being attributable to 
characteristics of individual items or their sequential relations. Within each set, the 
order of item presentation was random. Locations were blocked such that all items 
associated with one location were presented prior to the second location. A 5 to 10 
minute delay was introduced between locations to temporally separate the encoding 
of items in each context. Baseline assessments of action performance were provided. 
The experimenter prompted the child to explore the object by saying “What you 
would do with it?” or “How would you play with it?” The experimenter noted if the 
child performed the target action.  
Following the baseline assessment, the experimenter verbally labeled the 
stimulus, associated the item with the location’s character, and performed the action 
associated with that item. For example, the experimenter said “This is Blicket’s police 
hat. Blicket does something special with it. Blicket hugs it. Squeeze it tight!” and 
performed the action. To ensure encoding, the child was asked to behaviorally 




reproduce the novel action associated with the item since action imitation supports 
subsequent memory performance more than event observation (Lukowski et al., 
2005). The play-like setting was designed to be an ecologically valid approximate of 
the child’s daily encoding experiences by providing a multifaceted and rich 
environment for the encoding of the item and the surrounding contextual details. 
Retrieval. Memory retrieval was assessed following a 24 to 48 hour 
delay using both electrophysiological and behavioral assessments. Event-related 
potentials (ERPs) associated with each stimulus were recorded prior to the behavioral 
retrieval session. Three 3-year-olds refused to comply with the ERP portion of the 
study. The discussion of the ERP data is beyond the scope of the current study and is 
not discussed further in the present report.  
During the behavioral assessment, each child was presented with the 54 items 
from the previous session (“old”) as well as 27 “new” items. This design is similar to 
those used in studies of older children and adults (Cycowicz et al., 2001; Ghetti et al., 
2010; Ofen et al., 2007; Marshall, Drummey, Fox, & Newcombe, 2002). First, the 
child was asked to judge if the item was “old” or “new.” If the child said the item was 
“new,” the item was placed in the “new” bin. If the child said the item was “old”, a 
forced choice assessment was given regarding the associated contextual details, (a) 
action and (b) location. For example, the child was asked “Did we play with this 
before?” and, if yes, “Did we make noise with it, hug it, or put it on our head?” After 
the child performed the action the experimenter asked “Which room does it go in?” 
The presentation of action and location were held constant for all participants in order 
to keep the child in the video camera’s visibility for subsequent action coding. The 




sequential order of the action prompt was counterbalanced between participants to 
reduce order effects. If the child responded verbally but did not automatically perform 
the action, the experimenter prompted the child to produce the action to aid coding 
accuracy. Then, the child was asked to place the item in the appropriate location.  
Coding. Following the retrieval session, the experimenter coded the 
location the child placed each item (Location 1, Location 2, or New) as there was no 
ambiguity in this measure. Actions were coded by four undergraduate students who 
were blind to the target action associated with each item because the experimenter 
could not code the action on-line and there may have been some subjectivity regarding 
which action the child performed. Each observer coded 8-10 sessions independently. 
Inter-rater reliability was calculated for 18% of the videos (n = 7, coders overlapped 
with other coders on 4 to 6 videos). The Krippendorff alpha was used to examine 
reliability since this measure allows for more than 2 observers and does not require 
that all observers code all instances (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). The Krippendorff 
alpha reliability coefficient was .9965. A 95% confidence interval of .9918 – 1.0 was 
obtained by using 10,000 bootstrapped samples. The single disagreement that existed 
re-examined by video and settled by the expert coder.  
Behavioral data was used to separate responses based on memory for items 
and contextual details. Item accuracy was assessed by the number of items identified 
as old divided by the total number of items viewed at encoding. Accuracy for 
contextual details was assessed by the total number of details recalled (combined 
location and action) divided by the number of items identified as old multiplied by 




two (since two contextual details are associated with each item). False recognition 
was assessed by the percentage of falsely recognized items out of total new items.   
Neuropsychological assessments.  
See Table 1 for a list of all tasks including their duration, associated 
dependent variables used for the current analyses, and score range.  
Table 1 
Memory Paradigm and Neuropsychological Assessment Dependent Measures 
Construct Task Time to Complete  Dependent Measures Range 
Memory Memory Paradigm 1st session: 45 
minutes 
Percent correctly identified old 
items 
0-100% 
  2nd session: 45 
minutes 
Percent  contextual details retrieved 0-100% 
   Percent false recognition 0-100% 
Intellectual  RV  5 minutes Sum of identified words (Scaled) 0-38 
Ability Block Design 10 minutes Sum of designs constructed 
(Scaled) 
0-40 
Executive  Day/Night Task 5 minutes Original response accuracy 0-16 
Functioning DoG 1-6 minutes Dichotomous success/failure to 
wait 
0, 1 
 Digit Span 5 minutes Total number of sequences recalled 0-28 
 DCCS 5-10 minutes Total response accuracy on 
standard and bordered versions (if 
applicable) 
0-18 
RV = Receptive Vocabulary, DoG = Delay of Gratification, DCCS = Dimensional Change Card Sort 
All neuropsychological assessments with the exception of the Receptive 
Vocabulary task were administered during the third session. Children completed the 
Receptive Vocabulary task during the first session prior to behavioral encoding to 
maintain consistency with the larger study. During the third session the task 
completion order was counterbalanced across participations in blocks to account for 
fatigue effects. Tasks were blocked into three groups with presentation order within 
each group the same across all participants. Tasks were blocked as follows, (a) 




day/night, Block Design, and Verbal Fluency, (b) delay of gratification and Narrative 
Memory, and (c) digit span and dimensional change card sort. Five minute breaks 
occurred between blocks of tasks. Performance on the Verbal Fluency task is beyond 
the scope of the current study and is not described in additional detail. 
General intelligence. Children completed two measures of general 
intellectual ability from the WPPSI-III (Weschler Preschool and Primary Scale of 
Intelligence, 3
rd
 ed; Weschler, 2002), Receptive Vocabulary and Block Design. The 
Receptive Vocabulary task required children to identify the picture out of four 
possible pictures that illustrated multiple target words’ meaning. Children received 
one point for each word correctly identified (see Appendix B for additional 
information about the administration and scoring of the Receptive Vocabulary task). 
For the Block Design task an experimenter modeled a block design or showed the 
child a pictorial representation of a block design. Then, the child was asked to 
replicate the figure using the blocks. Children received one or two points for each 
design correctly configured based on the item and whether more than one trial was 
necessary for accurate performance (see Appendix C for additional information about 
the administration and scoring of the Block Design task). Scores scaled by age were 
obtained from the WPPSI-III Scoring Manual. Total scores were used to examine 
age-related performance differences, and scaled scores from the Receptive 
Vocabulary and Block Design tasks were summed and used to examine where general 
intellectual ability influenced the relations between executive functioning and 
memory constructs.  




Narrative memory. Children performed the Narrative Memory task, a 
subtest from the NEPSY-II (Neuropsychological assessment, 2
nd
 ed., Korkman, Kirk, 
& Kemp, 2007). Story recall tasks such as this have been shown to recruit the MTL 
memory system in adults, as evidenced by deficits shown following temporal 
lobectomy particularly with excisions of the hippocampus (Frisk & Milner, 1990). 
Thus, in the proposed study, the Narrative Memory task is a marker task of MTL 
functioning. The 3- and 6-year-old children heard different stories standardized for 
children of their age. Three-year-olds saw a picture and heard the story, but 6-year-
olds only heard the story. Memory was assessed at three levels of difficulty 
immediately following the narrative. First, children were asked to repeat the story to 
the experimenter (Free Recall). Then, for details that were not recalled, children were 
asked prompted questions (Cued Recall). Last, all children were asked a forced 
choice question for each detail (Recognition). Task performance was coded during 
administration. Children received two points for each detail retrieved during Free 
Recall and one point for each detail retrieved during Cued Recall and Recognition. 
Percent scores were obtained for Free Recall, the summed score of Free and Cued 
Recall, and Recognition since the number of items differ for stories heard by 3- and 
6-year-old children (see Appendix D for additional information about the 
administration and scoring of the Narrative Memory task). The Free and Cued Recall 
and Recognition measures were selected for analysis since 3-year-old children 
performed so poorly on the Free Recall measure although analyses revealed a similar 
pattern or results when either Free Recall or Free and Cued Recall was used.  




Executive function. Multiple measures of executive functioning were 
utilized in order to determine the relation between memory constructs and working 
memory, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility.  
   Day/night task. A modified version of the day/night task was 
used in the proposed study as a measure of conflict inhibition (Gerstadt et al., 1994; 
Passler et al., 1985; for a similar task see Carlson & Moses, 2001). Similar to stimuli 
used by Gerstadt and colleagues (1994), one stimulus was a yellow sun on a white 
background and the other was a white moon and stars on a dark blue background. The 
illustration of icons closely associated with representations of day and night are 
assumed to require more inhibition than solid colored cards used by Passler and 
colleagues (1985) and Carlson and Moses (2001). However, unlike the design of 
Gerstadt and colleagues (1994), children were not asked to produce responses upon 
seeing the stimuli because young 3-year-old children were not able to complete their 
task. The current procedure more closely resembles that of Passler and colleagues 
(1985). The children sat in front of a table that has each 8.5” x 11” stimulus placed 
side by side. The location of the stimuli was counterbalanced across participants. To 
verify understanding of the pictorial representations, children were asked which 
picture showed “day” and which showed “night.” Children were asked to point to 
“night” when the experimenter said “day” and to point to “day” when the 
experimenter said “night.” Children were given practice trials to ensure they 
understood the procedure. If children did not understand the practice trials, they were 
not administered the test trials (n = 1 3-year-old excluded from analyses). Similar to 




Gerstadt and colleagues (1994), 16 test trials were given in the same pseudorandom 
prompt sequence for each child.  
Data was coded by an undergraduate student for accuracy of the children’s 
original response using Interact coding software (Mangold, 1998). Based on previous 
research, 3-year-olds were expected to perform with lower accuracy compared to 6-
year-olds (Gerstadt et al., 1994; see Appendix E for additional information about the 
administration and scoring of the day/night task). Based on previous research, the 
current study only used the original response accuracy response as the dependent 
measure (Carlson, 2005). Inter-rater reliability was calculated for 21% of the sessions 
(n = 8, 4 for each age group). There were no disagreements between coders for the 
original response accuracy measure. 
   Delay of gratification. Delay of gratification, a measure of 
delayed inhibition, was assessed using a paradigm that required children to choose 
between a small immediate reward or a larger delayed reward (see Mischel et al., 
1989, for a review). Children were seated behind a table in a plainly decorated room. 
Similar to Houck and Lecuyer-Maus (2004), children were asked if they would like 
marshmallows, goldfish, or M&M’s to equate reward desire. Consistent with Carlson 
(2005), children were shown 2 versus 10 of their chosen item on separate paper plates 
and asked which amount they preferred. Then, similar to Mischel and Ebbesen (1970) 
the experimenter explained the task to the child by saying. “I have to go out of the 
room for a little while. If you wait until I come back you can eat these [point to 
preferred reward]. Or you can eat these [point to unpreferred reward] and I will come 
right back. But if you eat these [point to unpreferred reward] then you can’t have 




these [point to preferred reward].” Children’s comprehension of the task was assessed 
by asking “What will happen if you wait for me to come back?” If necessary, the 
experimenter explained the task again. Then, the experimenter left the room until the 
child ate the reward or until 5 minutes elapsed. Consistent with Carlson (2005), when 
the experimenter returned, the child was asked “What happens now?” and “Why did 
you wait/not wait?” Then, all children received all 12 snacks. The dependent measure 
used in the current analyses was dichotomously scored for whether the child waited 
or ate the marshmallow (see Appendix F for additional information about the 
administration and scoring of the delay of gratification task). 
   Digit span. Children performed a digit span task to measure 
working memory. Previous research has demonstrated that children as young as 34 
months are capable of performing this task (Gathercole & Adams, 1993). The current 
protocol was similar to that of Gathercole & Adams (1993). Children were read digit 
sequences from four lists spanning from two to seven digits. All children began with 
sequences of two digits. At each level if children correctly repeated sequences for 
three out of four lists, they were read lists with the length of the sequences increased 
by one. If children incorrectly repeat two sequences from the current level, the 
assessment ended. The children’s score was the total number of sequences correctly 
identified (see Appendix G for additional information about the administration and 
scoring of the digit span task). This measure was chosen in order to maximize task 
variability. 
   Dimensional change card sort. Cognitive flexibility was 
recruited using the dimensional change card sort (DCCS) task. The DCCS was 




administered in accord with the protocol developed by Zelazo (2006). Children sat in 
front of a table with two target cards (i.e., a blue rabbit and a red boat) situated above 
a small tray used to sort the test cards (i.e., four red rabbits and four blue boats). For 
the standard version, children were asked to sort cards by color and shape. The 
dimension that was presented first was counterbalanced across participants. The 
experimenter illustrated how to sort by the first dimension using each type of test 
card. Prior to each trial children were reminded of the dimension being used to sort 
the card. After six trials, children were taught how to sort based on the second 
dimension verbally. The experimenter did not demonstrate how to sort by the second 
dimension. Then the same protocol was used to administer trials during the post-
switch phase. The number of correct responses on the post-switch phase was coded 
offline.  
 Children who correctly sorted at least five test cards correctly performed a 
more challenging border version appropriate for children as old as 7 years. The 
previously sorted cards were removed from the sorting trays. Four red rabbits and 
three blue boats were combined with bordered test cards (i.e., four bordered red 
rabbits and three bordered blue boats). Children sorted the bordered cards by color 
and cards without borders by shape. The experimenter illustrated the rules with red 
rabbit cards with and without a border. Accuracy was determined by the number of 
correct responses out of the 12 test trials. Based on previous research, approximately 
half of the 6-year-olds were expected to correctly sort 9 of 12 test trials (Carlson, 
2005; Hongwanishkul, Happaney, Lee & Zelazo, 2005). Performance was scored by 
undergraduate students using Interact coding software (Mangold, 1998). Inter-rater 




reliability was calculated for 21% of the sessions (n = 8, 4 for each age group). There 
were no accuracy disagreements between coders for the pre switch, post switch, or 
bordered version phases of the DCCS task (see Appendix H for additional 
information about the administration and scoring of the DCCS task). The dependent 
measure selected for this task was the total number of accurate responses summed 
across the standard and bordered versions of the task.  
 Data Analysis Plan 
 Prior to analysis, three dependent measures were selected for the memory 
paradigm, two for the Narrative Memory task, and one dependent measure was 
selected for each general intellectual ability and executive function measure taking 
into account the previous literature, the most central measure of the construct of 
interest, and measure variability (see Table 1 for a list of selected dependent 
variables). All dependent measures were examined for outliers and normal 
distribution and accounted for as necessary.  
Hypotheses 
Please see Table 2 for the condensed list of hypotheses. 
Memory paradigm and neuropsychological assessments. For the memory 
paradigm, I hypothesized that 3-year-old children would be less successful in 
remembering individual items (Hypothesis 1), recalling their contextual details 
(Hypothesis 2), and rejecting novel items (Hypothesis 3) than 6-year-old children. 
Similarly, I expected 3-year-old children to be less successful on the narrative 
memory task and all executive function tasks (Hypothesis 4). To examine these 




hypotheses I conducted a multivariate analysis of variance using the 10 dependent 
measures listed in Table 1. 
Table 2  
Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis Supported/Not 
supported 
Hypothesis 1 3-year-olds will recognize fewer items than 6-year-olds Not supported 
Hypothesis 2 3-year-olds will remember fewer contextual details than 6-
year-olds 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3 3-year-olds will falsely recognize more items than 6-year-olds Supported 
Hypothesis 4 3-year-olds will perform more poorly on all general intellectual 
ability, executive function, and standardized memory measures 
than 6-year-olds. 
Supported 




Hypothesis 6 Recognition on NM task will be related to recognition on our 
paradigm. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 7 Cued recall on NM task will be related to memory for 
contextual details. 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 8 Cued recall on NM task will be related to false recognition.  Supported 
Hypothesis 9 DN and DCCS performance will be related to memory for 
contextual details. 
Partially supported; 
DN in high 
performers  
Hypothesis 10 DN and DCCS performance will be related to false recognition. Partially supported 
(not controlling for 
general intellectual 
ability) 
Hypothesis 11 DS and DoG performance will not be related to memory for 
contextual details. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 12 DS and DoG performance will not be related to false 
recognition. 
Supported 
DCCS = Dimensional Change Card Sort, DN = Day/Night, DoG = Delay of gratification, DS= Digit span, NM = Narrative 
Memory 
Relations between general intellectual ability and memory. General 
intellectual ability, as assessed by the Receptive Vocabulary and Block Design tasks, 
was expected to be related to memory performance (Hypothesis 5) at each age. 




Separate hierarchical multiple regression analyses were used to predict the percent of 
items correctly identified as old, percent of contextual details retrieved, and percent of 
items falsely recognized. Each predictor was entered in a separate block, and the 
order of entry (age group, composite general intellectual ability score, and an 
interaction term for age group and the composite general intellectual ability score) 
was the same for all regressions. Age group was used for all regression analyses 
rather than exact ages. Since participants were selectively recruited from two age 
groups age was not normally distributed, and these types of distributions inflate 
correlation and regression coefficients (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).  If general 
intellectual ability predicted memory for items, details, or false recognition, this 
factor was used as a control variable for analyses examining the relations between 
executive functioning and memory. 
Relation between performance on Narrative Memory task and memory 
paradigm. Narrative memory measures were expected to be related to memory on 
the experimental paradigm. Separate hierarchical multiple regression analyses were 
used to predict the percent of items correctly identified as old, percent of contextual 
details retrieved, and percent of items falsely recognized using the cued recall and 
recognition measures from the Narrative Memory task. The order of entry (age group, 
general intellectual ability, cued recall and recognition, and the age group x cued 
recall and age group x recognition interactions) was the same for all regressions. 
Recognition was expected to be related to memory for individual items (Hypothesis 
6) whereas cued recall was expected to be related to memory for contextual details 
(Hypothesis 7) and false alarms (Hypothesis 8). 




Relations between executive functioning and memory.  Conflict inhibition 
and cognitive flexibility were expected to be related to memory for contextual details 
(Hypothesis 9) and false recognition (Hypothesis 10) as indexed by original response 
accuracy on the day/night task and performance on the DCCS, respectively. However, 
performance on the delay of gratification and digit span task, measures of delay 
inhibition and working memory, were not expected to be related to memory for 
contextual details (Hypothesis 11) or false recognition (Hypothesis 12). Exploratory 
analyses were also conducted to examine whether the relation between executive 
functioning and memory differed as a function of age.  
These hypotheses were examined using separate hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses to predict memory for contextual details and false recognition. 
Age group was entered in the first block, general intellectual ability was included in 
the second block, and all four executive function measures were added to the third 
block.  
Chapter 3: Results 
Memory Paradigm 
 Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3. A multivariate ANOVA 
revealed a significant group effect, p < .001. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the univariate 
test showed that 3- and 6-year-old children were equally likely to correctly recognize 
previously viewed items, F(1, 36) = .62, p = .44. Further analyses suggested that 3- 
and 6-year-olds recognition responses may have been influenced by different factors. 
Three-year-old children’s recognition percentage was positively correlated with false 




alarms, r(19) = .46, p = .049 whereas 6-year-olds showed a trend in the opposite 
direction, r(19) = -.43, p = .07. This suggests that 3-year-olds showed an overall 
propensity to either accept or reject items. However, 6-year-olds who were better at 
recognizing previously encountered items were also better at rejecting new items. 
Consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 3, 3-year-old children were less accurate in 
identifying contextual details associated with items, F(1, 36) = 11.71, p < .01, and 
were more likely to commit false recognition, F(1, 36) = 5.38, p = .03.  
Neuropsychological Assessments  
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3. In support of Hypothesis 4, 3-
year-olds performed worse than 6-year-olds on the Receptive Vocabulary, F(1, 36) = 
36.47, p < .001, and Block Design tasks, F(1, 36) = 84.3, p < .001, measures of 
general intellectual ability. Three-year-old children performed more poorly than 6-
year-old children on all measures of neuropsychological function. Three-year-olds 
demonstrated lower levels of narrative memory as well as executive functioning for 
the constructs of inhibition, working memory, and cognitive flexibility. Younger 
children demonstrated poorer narrative memory as indexed by lower levels of cued 
recall, F(1, 36) = 47.13, p < .001, and recognition, F(1, 36) = 40.58, p < .001. In 
terms of conflict inhibition and cognitive flexibility, 3-year-olds also made more 
errors on the day/night task, F(1, 36) = 23.21, p < .001, as well as the DCCS task, 
F(1, 36) = 26.62, p < .001.  Three-year-olds also recalled fewer sequences on the digit 
span task, F(1, 36) = 25.19, p < .001, and were less likely to delay gratification F(1, 
36) = 4.69, p = .04.  




Table 3  
Performance by 3- and 6-year-olds on Memory, General Intellectual Ability, and 
Executive Function Measures 
 
3-year-old 
children (n = 19) 
 
6-year-old children 
(n = 19) 
 MANOVA 
statistics 
Construct M SE  M  SE  F P 
Memory         
Item Recognition (%) 79.63 6.28  85.17 3.25  .62 .44 
Contextual Details (%) 49.2 2.19  58.36 1.54  11.7 .002* 
False Recognition (%) 34.47 8.97  10.71 4.95  5.38 .03* 
Intellectual Ability          
      Receptive Vocabulary  21.89 1.01  29.84 .85  36.47 < .001* 
Block Design 15.32 .82  27.32 1.02  84.3 < .001* 
Narrative Memory         
Cued Recall (%) 20.04 8.97  54.74 4.41  47.13 < .001* 
Recognition (%) 65.89 3.27  89.47 1.73  40.58 < .001* 
Executive Functioning         
Day/Night Task 6.84 .99  13.21 .87  23.21 < .001* 
Delay of Gratification .68 .11  .95 .05  4.69 .037* 
Digit Span 7.53 .731  12.21 .58  25.19 < .001* 
DCCS 5.63 1.39  14.37 .97  26.62 < .001* 
* Significant at p ≤  .05 
Memory, General Intellectual Ability, and Executive Functioning  
General intellectual ability and memory. Contrary to Hypothesis 5, 
regression analyses revealed that when age group was entered in the model first, 
neither general intellectual ability nor the interaction between age group and general 
intellectual ability significantly improved the prediction of memory for individual 
items or contextual details (see Table 4).  





Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Episodic Memory 
Performance Using General Intellectual Ability, Age, and Their Interaction as 
Predictors 
Variable R2  F  ΔF  β  t 
Item Recognition          
Step 1: Age group .02  .62       
Step 2: General intellectual ability .03  .49  .37     
Step 3: Age group * general 
intellectual ability 
.07  .79  1.39     
Contextual Details          
Step 1: Age group .25  11.7*       
Step 2: General intellectual ability .3  7.43*  2.63     
Step 3: Age group * general 
intellectual ability 
.34  5.82*  2.11     
False Recognition          
Step 1: Age group .13  5.38*       
Step 2: General intellectual ability .29  7.04*  7.7*     
Age group       -.45  -3.07* 
General intellectual ability       -.41  -2.78* 
Step 3: Age group * general 
intellectual ability 
.29  4.65*  .2     
* Significant at p ≤  .05 
However, general intellectual ability and age group significantly predicted 
false recognition, F(2, 35) = 7.04, p < .01. The model including both of these factors 
was better than the model only including age group, ΔF(1,35) = 7.7, p < .01. Older 
children, β = -.45, t(37) = -3.07, p < .01, and children with higher general intellectual 
ability, β = -.41, t(37) = -2.78, p < .01, were less likely to falsely recognize novel 
items.  
Relations between performance on the Narrative Memory task and 
memory paradigm. Contrary to Hypotheses 6-8, regression analyses did not support 




a relation between memory performance on the Narrative Memory task and memory 
for individual items, contextual details, or false recognition when controlling for age 
and general intellectual ability (see Table 5).  
Table 5 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Episodic Memory 
Performance Using Narrative Memory Performance Measures as Predictors 
Variable R2  F  ΔF 
Item Recognition      
Step 1: Age group .02  .62   
Step 2: General intellectual ability .03  .49  .37 
Step 3: Narrative Memory  .07  .64  .8 
Step 4: Narrative Memory*age group .12  .71  .85 
Contextual Details      
Step 1: Age group .25  11.7*   
Step 2: General intellectual ability .3  7.43*  2.63 
Step 3: Narrative Memory  .33  4.06*  .79 
Step 4: Narrative Memory*age group .34  2.6*  .11 
False Recognition      
Step 1: Age group .13  5.38*   
Step 2: General intellectual ability .29  7.04*  7.7* 
Step 3: Narrative Memory  .37  4.93*  2.3 
Step 4: Narrative Memory*age group .39  3.36*  .52 
* Significant at p ≤  .05, Narrative Memory included the Cued Recall and Recognition percentage scores 
Relations between executive functioning and performance on the memory 
paradigm. Analyses were conducted both including and excluding general 
intellectual ability as a control variable. Analyses excluding general intellectual 
ability were conducted to be consistent with previous literature. However, the one 
study that has controlled for general intellectual ability found that doing diminished 
the relation between some executive function measures and memory for contextual 
details (Drummey & Newcombe, 2002). Executive functioning did not significantly 




predict memory for individual items or contextual details, contrary to Hypothesis 9. 
In contrast, executive functioning did predict false recognition controlling for age 
group, ΔF(4,32) = 3.25, p = .03, and accuracy on the DCCS was the only significant 
predictor, β = -.46, t(37) = -2.25, p = .03, see Table 6. In opposition to Hypothesis 10, 
when controlling for age group and general intellectual ability, executive functioning 
no longer accounted for additional variance in false recognition, F(4, 31) = 1.53, p = 
.22, see Table 7.  
Table 6 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Episodic Memory 
Performance Using Executive Functioning Measures as Predictors (Without General 
Intelligence) 
Variable R2  F  ΔF  β  t 
Item Recognition          
Step 1: Age group .02  .62       
Step 2: Executive functioning .15  1.15  1.28     
Step 3: Age group * Executive functioning .27  1.16  1.15     
Contextual Details          
Step 1: Age group .25  11.71*       
Step 2: Executive functioning .2  2.8*  .68     
Step 3: Age group * Executive functioning .1  1.47  .17     
False Recognition          
Step 1: Age group .13  5.38*       
Step 2: Executive functioning .29  3.95*  .3.25*     
Age group       .24  1.02 
Day/Night       -.3  -1.56 
Dimensional Change Card Sort       -.46  -2.25* 
Delay of gratification       -.16  -1.09 
Digit Span       -.08  -.44 
Step 3: Age group * Executive functioning .19  1.97*  .08     
* Significant at p ≤.05, DCCS = Dimensional Change Card Sort 





Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Episodic Memory 
Performance Using Executive Functioning Measures as Predictors (Including 
General Intelligence) 
Variable R2  F  ΔF 
Item Recognition      
Step 1: Age group & general intellectual ability .03  .49  .49 
Step 2: Executive functioning .2  1.29  1.67 
Step 3: Age group * Executive functioning .31  1.19  1.03 
Contextual Details      
Step 1: Age group & general intellectual ability .3  7.43   
Step 2: Executive functioning .32  2.47  .29 
Step 3: Age group * Executive functioning .34  1.36  .12 
False Recognition      
Step 1: Age group & general intellectual ability .29  7.04*   
Step 2: Executive functioning .4  3.51*  1.53 
Step 3: Age group * Executive functioning .41  1.89  .09 
* Significant at p ≤  .05 
Given previous studies in older children that have found a relation between 
executive functioning and memory for contextual information (Cycowicz et al., 2001; 
Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Ruffman et al., 2001; Picard et al., 2012), additional 
analyses were conducted to further probe Hypothesis 9. One potential explanation for 
the null finding above is that children who performed at or below chance on either the 
action or location detail may have obscured the relation between memory and 
executive functioning since any variability in memory for action or location below 
chance, arguably, could not be accounted for theoretically (see Drummey & 
Newcombe, 2002 for a similar argument).  In order to assess this hypothesis, 9 
children with either ≤ 33% action accuracy or ≤ 50% location accuracy (6 3-year-
olds, 3 6-year-olds) were excluded from analyses. The same regression analysis as 




above was conducted to examine the relations among general intellectual ability, 
executive functioning, and memory for contextual details with this subset of children.  
 As shown in Table 8, general intellectual ability and age group marginally 
predicted memory for contextual information, F(2, 26) = 3.33, p = .05. Including 
executive functioning the model was significant, F(6, 22) = 2.69, p = .04. The change 
in model fit above age group and general intellectual ability did not meet the 
conventional level of significance. However, because of previous literature, decreased 
power due to sample size, and my specific a priori hypotheses, I examined whether 
any of the executive function measures were significant predictors of memory for 
contextual details. Consistent with a portion of Hypothesis 9, accuracy on the 
day/night task was the only significant predictor of memory for contextual details, β = 
.68, t(28) = 2.77, p = .01.   
Table 8 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Memory for Contextual 
Details Using Executive Functioning Measures as Predictors in Subset of Children 
Above Chance Performance on Action and Location Detail 
Variable R2  F  ΔF  β  t 
Contextual Details          
Step 1: Age & general  
intellectual ability 
 
.45  3.33*       
Step 2: Executive Functioning .65  2.69*  2.09^     
Age group       -.23  -.62 
General intellectual 
ability 
      -.08  -.35 
Day/Night       .68  2.77* 
Dimensional Change 
Card Sort 
      -.01  -.03 
Delay of Gratification       .09  .5 
Digit Span       .22  .9 
Step 3: EF*Age .68  1.51  .28     
* Significant at p ≤ .05, ^ p = .12, EF = Executive Functioning 




Chapter 4: Discussion 
This purpose of this study was to conduct a systematic assessment of the 
relations between episodic memory and executive functioning in early childhood 
taking into account age and general intellectual ability. Children’s memory for 
contextual information is important because it underlies our personal past and can 
influence problem solving and decision making about future behaviors. Three- and 6-
year-old children were included since significant improvements are present in 
memory and executive functioning during this developmental period. To fully 
understand the ways these constructs are related, the current study included measures 
of children’s memory for individual items, contextual details, false recognition, all 
four core constructs of executive functioning (cognitive flexibility, conflict inhibition, 
delay inhibition, working memory), and general intellectual ability. The results 
suggested complex relations between episodic memory, executive functioning, age, 
and general intelligence. Of particular note was the finding that suggested executive 
functioning, in particular conflict inhibition, does influence memory for contextual 
details in early childhood even when controlling for age and general intellectual 
ability. This relation is discussed in detail below, followed by discussion of the other 
findings. 
Memory for Contextual Details and Executive Functioning 
This study adds to the literature the novel finding that performance on the 
day/night task, a measure of conflict inhibition, significantly predicts memory for 
contextual information in high performing 3- and 6-year-old children. This finding is 
important because it 1.) shows that particular executive functioning abilities influence 




memory for contextual details and 2.) highlights the importance of considering 
individual differences in cognitive abilities.  
There is a growing number of studies that have assessed the relations between 
executive functioning and memory for contextual details in children. However, these 
studies have not examined all of the core constructs of executive functioning 
(Cycowicz et al., 2001; Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Picard et al., 2012; Ruffman 
et al., 2010). The present study filled this critical gap in the literature by including 
measures of four critical executive function domains. Motivated by previous studies 
that have shown memory for contextual details to be related to conflict inhibition and 
cognitive flexibility (Cycowicz et al., 2001; Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Picard et 
al., 2012; Ruffman et al., 2010) as well as lesion data suggesting that the region (i.e., 
DLPFC) responsible for these skills plays a role in memory for contextual 
information (Kopelman et al., 1997), I hypothesized that memory for contextual 
details would be related to conflict inhibition and cognitive flexibility. In contrast to 
the multiple studies relating conflict inhibition and cognitive flexibility to memory for 
contextual information, only one study in children has examined working memory. 
This study found that working memory was indiscriminately related to memory 
performance (i.e., was not specifically related to memory for contextual details; 
Ruffman et al., 2001). No studies to date had included measures of emotional 
inhibition. Based on the study by Ruffman and colleagues (2001) as well as the 
developmental trajectory and neural correlates of working memory and delay 
inhibition (Berlin et al., 2004; Carlson, 2005; Crammond, 1992; Diamond, 2006; 




Luciana & Nelson, 2002; Menna, 1989; Mischel et al., 1989), I hypothesized that 
these constructs would not predict memory for contextual details. 
To address the multidimensional nature of children’s memories, the current 
study included measures of children’s memory for action and location. In the 
developmental literature a number of association paradigms have been developed to 
assess memory for many contextual details, including temporal order (Riggins et al., 
2009), spatial context (Picard et al., 2012), the source of learned information 
(Drummey & Newcombe, 2002), item-item associations (Lloyd et al., 2009; 
Sluzenski et al., 2006), and item color (Cycowicz et al., 2001).  These researchers all 
discuss the process of recollection as underlying memory these various contextual 
details. Based on this literature, the current study assessed the relations between 
executive functioning and children’s memory for action and location considered 
together. When all children were included in the analysis, executive functioning did 
not predict memory for contextual information beyond age and general intellectual 
ability. However, I hypothesized that executive functioning would predict memory 
for details only in children with above chance performance since variability below 
chance cannot be accounted for theoretically (see Drummey & Newcombe, 2002, for 
a similar argument). The results were in line with my hypothesis. Executive 
functioning showed a trend for predicting memory for contextual details above age 
group and general intellectual ability. This result did not reach the conventional level 
of statistical significance likely due to the decrease in power associated with the 
diminished sample size. Based on my a priori hypotheses about how various 
executive function abilities would be related to memory for contextual details, I 




examined the individual predictors. Conflict inhibition, as assessed by the day/night 
task, predicted children’s memory for contextual details in the subset of children who 
performed above chance. This finding underscores the importance of taking 
individual differences in behavioral performance into account, especially during 
periods of developmental change when some children may not have acquired 
proficiency in skills of interest. Furthermore, this result is consistent with the relation 
between executive functioning, specifically conflict inhibition and cognitive 
flexibility, and memory for contextual details in older children (Cycowicz et al., 
2001; Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Picard et al., 2012; Ruffman et al., 2001) and 
normal aging (Craik et al., 1990; Fabiani & Friedman, 1996; Glisky et al., 1995). 
The findings discussed above are based on memory for action and location 
collapsed together. However, the binding of item and context model proposed by 
Diana and colleagues (2007) suggests that different types of contextual details are 
subserved by different cognitive and neural processes. Specifically, items and details 
that are unitized into single events (i.e., red elephant) are processed differently from 
non- unitized items and details (i.e., the elephant is associated with the color red 
because it is standing in a barn; Diana et al., 2007; Eichenbaum et al., 2007).  Item 
and contextual information are processed in the perirhinal and parahippocampal 
cortices, respectively. Unitized details, such as object color, can be processed by the 
perirhinal cortex and supported by the process of familiarity. In contrast, item and 
non-unitized contextual information must be bound in the hippocampus and 
supported by the process of recollection. Motivated by neuroanatomical evidence 
showing that the parahippocampal cortex receives strong projections from the 




DLPFC, I hypothesized that memory for non-unitized details would be more 
influenced by executive functioning processes than unitized details.   
 The current study employed memory for action and location as the contextual 
details of interest. Many researchers have argued that memory for action is “special 
(Engelkamp, 1998; Zimmer, Cohen, Guynn, Engelkamp, Kormi-Nouri, & Foley, 
2001).” Memory is better for self-performed actions in both adults and children 
(Baker-Ward, Hess & Flannagan, 1990; Engelkamp, 1998; Lukowski et al., 2005; 
Zimmer et al., 2001). Further, when participants retrieve memory for action, they 
recruit neural regions responsible for motor activity (i.e., premotor, supplementary 
motor, and cerebellar areas) in addition to medial temporal lobe regions (Ingvar & 
Philipsson, 1977; Nyberg, Petersson, Nilsson, Sandblom, Aberg, & Ingvar, 2001; 
Roland, Larsen, Lassen, & Skinhoj, 1980). The additional recruitment of motor 
regions may underlie better memory for action than other contextual information and 
may make memory for actions less reliant on other cognitive processes, such as 
executive functioning.  Memory for location, in comparison, likely requires binding 
processes described by the binding of item and context model since this is a non-
unitized contextual detail (Diana et al., 2007; Eichenbaum et al., 2007) and/or 
retrieval search processes conducted by the prefrontal cortex (Dobbins, Foley, 
Schacter, & Wagner, 2002; Wagner, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998). Thus, I 
expected that memory for location would be more influenced by executive 
functioning skills than memory for action.  
Additional analyses not reported in the results section were conducted to 
examine whether relations between memory for contextual details and executive 




functioning differed between memory for action and location. Consistent with my 
hypothesis, regression analyses revealed that accuracy on the day/night task, the 
measure of conflict inhibition, significantly predicted memory for location. However, 
no executive function measure predicted memory for action. These findings are 
important as they provide support for the argument that contextual details are not all 
processed similarly. Based on this finding, previous results about the relation between 
executive functioning and memory for contextual details need to be considered in 
terms of the binding of item and context model. For example, Manning and 
colleagues (2007) reported a weak relation between recency judgments (i.e., the 
selected contextual detail) and executive functioning in young adults. This finding 
could be due to the use of recency judgments since they can be accurately made by 
relying on familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002). Additionally, future studies should also be 
designed with this framework in mind. One weakness of the current study is that 
action and location are very distinct details and may have differed in multiple 
respects, once of which includes salience. Future investigations should control for 
stimulus type, modality, and salience across the unitized and non-unitized conditions 
(e.g., see Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2009 for a paradigm that fits these criteria) 
and examine how executive functioning relates to these distinct binding processes 
across development.  
False Recognition and Executive Functioning 
The current study found that, when not controlling for general intellectual 
ability, performance on the DCCS task significantly predicted false recognition. Out 
of the few studies that have assessed the relation between executive functioning and 




false recognition (McCabe and colleagues, 2009; Melinder et al., 2006; Roberts & 
Powell, 2005; Ruffman et al., 2001), they have consistently found relations between 
inhibition and false recognition (Melinder et al., 2006; Roberts & Powell, 2005; 
Ruffman et al., 2001). Although the DCCS was selected as a measure of cognitive 
flexibility, this task is not process pure and also requires inhibition, particularly 
during the bordered version of the task. Thus, our finding is consistent with previous 
literature documenting a relation between false recognition and executive functioning. 
However, as discussed below, the relation between false recognition and executive 
functioning was reduced when controlling for general intellectual ability.  
General Intelligence and Memory 
In addition to examining how executive functioning was related to memory 
for contextual details and false recognition, the current study also included measures 
of general intellectual ability. Previously, Drummey & Newcombe (2002) showed 
that controlling for general intellectual ability can diminish the relations between 
executive functioning and memory for contextual details in 4-year-old children. In 
this study, executive functioning, particularly on the day/night task, predicted 
memory for contextual details in high performing children even when controlling for 
age group and general intellectual ability. In line with arguments by other researchers 
(Herlitz & Yonker, 2002), this suggests that memory for items and their details on 
this paradigm was domain specific. This finding is consistent with that of Drummey 
& Necombe (2002) in which 4-year-olds’ performance on a child-friendly version of 
the WCST continued to significantly predict source memory when controlling for 
general intellectual ability.  




In contrast, when controlling for general intellectual ability, the relation 
between executive functioning and false recognition was diminished. This is 
important because it suggests that the relation between executive functioning and 
false recognition is not specific. Rather, more general individual differences in 
cognitive abilities account for this relation. Whether the relation between false 
recognition and executive functioning is completely accounted for by general 
intellectual ability will need to be examined in a large sample since performance on 
the DCCS still showed a trend to predict false recognition even when general 
intellectual ability was included in the model.    
To my knowledge, the relation between intelligence and false recognition has 
not been documented in previous studies. This finding provides further support for 
the separation of true and false recognition as distinct cognitive and neural processes 
(Farovik et al., 2008; Garoff-Eaton, Slotnick, & Schacter, 2005) since true 
recognition was not related to intelligence. Although numerous explanations could 
explain this relation, one possibility is that the Receptive Vocabulary and Block 
Design measures used to assess general intellectual ability may have been tapping 
skills that influence false recognition. For example, problem solving, persistence, and 
task-focused maintained attention which are necessary for optimal performance on 
the Block Design task may also have been necessary while performing our task since 
many items were encountered at encoding and retrieval. Similarly if children with 
better Vocabulary performance were more likely to encode the object labels they may 
have been less likely to falsely endorse seeing novel items.  
General Findings 




Generally, this study also examined age-related differences in cognitive 
abilities, whether the relations between executive functioning and memory constructs 
differed as a function of age, and relations between our experimental paradigm and a 
standardized measure of memory. Three-year-olds performed more poorly than 6-
year-olds on all but one measure of memory, executive functioning, and general 
intellectual ability. This finding is consistent with previous studies documenting age-
related changes in these abilities in early childhood (see Diamond, 2006, and Zelazo, 
2008, for reviews on executive functioning development and Bauer, 2006, for a 
review on memory development). In terms of memory performance, children were 
better able to remember contextual details and resist falsely recognizing new items 
with age (Baker-Ward et al., 1993; Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Lindsay et al., 
1991; Lloyd et al., 2009; Picard et al., 2012; Pillemer et al., 1994; Riggins et al., 
2009; Sluzenski et al., 2006). An age-related difference in children’s recognition of 
previously viewed items was not present in the current study. Although some studies 
report linear increases in children’s memory for individual items and/or actions 
(Drummey & Newcombe, 2002), the findings are mixed (Lloyd et al., 2009; Riggins 
et al., 2009). Whether or not age-related increases are found for item recognition may 
be dependent on the type of information assessed. For example, Drummey and 
Newcombe (2002) asked children to recall answers to facts learned during the 
experiment. This may be a more difficult task than asking children which actions 
were performed with objects (Riggins et al., 2009) or to acknowledge (via 
recognition) whether stimuli were previously encountered (Lloyd et al., 2009) , as 
was done in the current study. These results cannot be compared to studies that utilize 




measures of d′ (i.e., difference scores created by subtracting false alarms from 
accurately recognized items) as it is impossible to discern whether age-related 
changes are in recognition and/or false alarm rates (Marshall et al., 2002; Sluzenski et 
al., 2006).  
The current study did not find that the relations between executive functioning 
and memory constructs were influenced by age. This question had not been addressed 
in the current literature. It seemed possible that, since 3-year-olds in particular 
perform worse than older children on executive function tasks overall (Diamond, 
2006; Zelazo et al., 2008), the relation may have differed as a function of age.  
However, executive functions continue to develop across childhood and into early 
adulthood (Luciana & Nelson, 2002). Thus, executive functioning may continue to 
influence memory for contextual details until the mature state is reached. Although 
concerns about the design used by Manning and colleagues (2007) were addressed 
above, it is possible that executive functioning specifically influences memory during 
childhood as these abilities are developing and in aging populations as memory and 
executive functioning skills begin to decline.  
We also found no relation between performance on the Narrative Memory 
task, a standardized assessment of memory, and our experimental paradigm when 
controlling for age group and general intellectual ability. This effect may have 
emerged due to different demands of the Narrative Memory task and our 
experimental memory paradigm. On the Narrative Memory task children were 
required to retrieve information from short story. Optimal performance required 
memory, processing efficiency, and verbal skills. In contrast, our paradigm was 




developed to be as child-friendly as possible. Children encoded each item in a play-
like setting to increase experience salience and at retrieval children were given a self-
paced forced-choice assessment to determine their memory for items and their details. 
Study Limitations  
One potential limitation of the current study involves the use of forced-choice 
assessments during our experimental memory paradigm. This measure was adapted 
from the infant memory literature to limit verbal skills necessary to perform our task. 
However, the use of forced-choice assessments did increase noise associated with the 
current paradigm. Correct action or location judgments included both items for which 
the children remembered that contextual detail as well as items for which the children 
correctly guessed. Despite this potential limitation, we believe that accurate indices of 
children’s memory performance are present using our paradigm, and the strengths of 
the current design (i.e., including two contextual details and limiting verbal 
requirements) outweigh the limitations.  
 Another important caveat is that neither performance on the current memory 
paradigm nor the neuropsychological tasks is process pure. As previously discussed, 
many association paradigms have been developed to assess children’s memory for 
contextual information. The process of recollection has been argued to subserve 
accurate performance on all of these various paradigms. However, familiarity can 
contribute to accurate source performance (Diana, Van den Boom, Yonelinas, & 
Ranganath, 2011; Diana et al. 2007), and may have done so on our paradigm. For 
example, children may have placed items in the location that overall seemed more 
familiar to them than the location that seemed less familiar. In regards to the 




executive function tasks, cognitive abilities required for accurate performance of 
various tasks often overlapped. For example, on the day/night task children had 
maintain the task rules in working memory and recruit inhibitory skills in order to 
perform satisfactorily. Further, these tasks are not specific for prefrontal functioning. 
In adults regions outside of the prefrontal cortex are also active, and performance on 
executive function does not reliably distinguish patients with frontal and temporal 
lesions (see Morgan & Lilienfeld, 2000 for additional discussion).   
 A final consideration surrounds the distinctiveness of executive functioning 
constructs. Many researchers agree that executive functioning in adults is separated 
into multiple constructs. However, these skills may not be distinct in early childhood. 
Using confirmatory factor analysis, executive functioning in young adults is best 
characterized by three factors that load onto inhibition, shifting, and updating 
(Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & Wagner, 2000). In children 2-6-
years-old, executive functioning is best explained by one factor (Wiebe, Espy, & 
Charak, 2008). This result may explain why in the current study executive 
functioning generally predicted memory for contextual details and false recognition in 
the whole sample with performance on no one executive function task being a 
significant individual predictor. Further, the brain regions that support performance of 
marker tasks in childhood may differ from those regions necessary for adults to 
perform the same task. This notion is supported by the increased neural specificity 
(i.e., increased activation of neural regions that correlate with behavioral performance 
and decreased activation of non-relevant regions) that has been documented on many 
cognitive tasks with age (Casey, Tottenham, Liston, & Durston, 2005).   




Chapter 5: Future Directions 
Many research areas should be investigated to extend the current study in the future. 
Future studies should determine whether the association between executive 
functioning and memory for contextual details is dependent on the type of contextual 
detail recalled. Children’s memory for location and action was assessed in the current 
study. As discussed above, each of these details has potential problems that may have 
influenced the presence of a relation between executive functioning and memory for 
contextual information. Studies with adults have shown that memory for item-feature 
and item-context relations differ and may recruit partially dissociable neural regions 
(Diana et al., 2007; Eichenbaum et al., 2007). Future studies should employ 
paradigms that include each of these types of contextual information in a single 
paradigm to discern whether item-feature or item-context information specifically is 
influenced by the development of executive functioning.  
The influence of executive functioning on either item-feature or item-context 
information should be examined in the future both through the continued use of 
marker tasks as well as with neuroimaging techniques that allow for the assessment of 
connections between brain regions. While performance on executive functioning 
tasks largely recruits the prefrontal cortex and memory tasks, such as the Narrative 
Memory task, differentially recruits the medial temporal lobes, memory for 
contextual information may be dependent on the strength of the connections between 
these brain regions. Resting-state functional connectivity and diffusion tensor 
imaging methods could be used as indices of PFC-MTL connections. Future studies 
could use these methods and determine the relation between PFC-MTL connectivity 




to performance on paradigms that assess memory for contextual information across 
development. 
Lastly, the relation between memory and executive function may be further 
elucidated through the assessment of children between the ages of 3- and 6-years old. 
The proposed study only assessed 3- and 6-year-old children during the first 6 months 
of their respective age ranges. Future studies conducted with children between 3- and 
6-years-old would be able to assess developmental changes in the relations between 
memory for contextual details, false recognition, and executive function with greater 
specificity. 
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Appendix B 
Receptive Vocabulary Protocol 
Materials 




 Materials included the WPPSI-III Administration and Scoring Manual and 
WPPSI-III Stimulus Booklet 1. 
Start  
2-3-year-olds began with Item 1, and 4-7-year-olds began with Item 6. If 4-7-
year-olds answered Item 6 incorrectly, the previous question was asked. This 
continued until they answered correctly and then task proceeded. If they answered 
Item 6 correctly, they automatically received 1 point per question for the first 5 items. 
Task  
The child was shown 4 pictures on a single page and asked to identify a 
particular item. For example, the child was shown the stimulus page for Item 1 and 
told to “Show me the foot.” The task continued to be administered in the same 
manner until the child consecutively answered 5 questions incorrectly or completed 
all 38 items.  
Scoring 
Scoring occurred during task administration. The child received 1 point for 
each item correctly identified. 
Dependent Measures 
 The Receptive Vocabulary dependent measure was the sum of the child’s 
correct responses. Scores scaled by age were obtained from the WPPSI-III 
Administration and Scoring Manual.  
Appendix C 
Block Design Protocol 





 Materials included the WPPSI-III Administration and Scoring Manual, 
WPPSI-III Stimulus Booklet 1, WPPSI-III blocks, and a stopwatch.  
Start 
2-3-year-olds began with Item 1, and 4-7-year-olds began with Item 6.  
Task 
For Items 1-12, the experimenter modeled a block design for the child. For 
Item 13, the child was shown a model and the pictorial representation. For Items 13-
20 the child had to create the block design based solely on the picture. For Items 1-10 
the child created block designs using four red and white solid blocks. For Items 11-20 
the child created block designs using four blocks that have 1 solid white side, 1 solid 
red side, and 4 diagonally separated sides that are half red and half white. Each item 
was timed. The child had 30 seconds to complete Items 1-7, 60 seconds for Items 8-
13, and 90 seconds for Items 14-20.   
 To begin the experimenter said, “Let’s play with blocks. Watch me.” 
 For each item the experimenter assembled the model while describing the 
construction aloud. For example, “I put a red block here and another red one here.” 
  Then, the experimenter prompted the child to create the model by 
saying, “Now you make it. Work as fast as you can and tell me when you are done. 
Go ahead.” 
 For Items 1-6 the child was given a maximum of 2 trials to correctly complete 
the task.  
 After Item 10, the child was instructed about the new blocks. 




 At Item 13 the experimenter showed how to make the design using the 
picture. For subsequent items the experimenter did not model the design for the child. 
Scoring 
Scoring occurred during task administration. For Items 1-6 the child received 
2 points if the design was correctly constructed on Trial 1 and 1 point if the design 
was correctly constructed on Trial 2. For subsequent trials the child received 2 points 
if the design was correctly constructed and 0 points if the design was incorrectly 
constructed.  
Dependent Measures 
 The Block Design dependent measure was the sum of the child’s correct 
responses. Scores scaled by age were obtained from the WPPSI-III Administration 
and Scoring Manual. 
 
  





Narrative Memory Protocol 
Materials 
 The NEPSY-II Stimulus Book was used for task administration. 
Start 
 3-4-year-olds and 5-10-year-olds completed different versions of the Narrative 
Memory task that were standardized for their respective ages.  
Task 
3-4-year-old task. 
 “I am going to tell you a story about this picture [point to the picture]. 
Listen very carefully then tell the story to me. Ready?” 
 “One Saturday, Daddy helped Suzie and Tony make cookies. Tony is 
Susie’s little brother. Tony made sugar cookies. Susie made chocolate chip cookies. 
Tony took the cookies to preschool for snack time. The boys and girls all said, 
“Thank you.” 
 Free recall. 
“Now tell me everything you can remember from the story and 
start from the beginning.” 
  If child had difficulty getting started, the experimenter asked, 
“How did the story start?” or say, “Let’s try. Once upon a time…” 
  If the child did not respond, the experimenter said, “Just tell 
me anything you can remember from the story about the cookies.” 




  If the child still did not respond, the experimenter said, “Tell 
me what happened on Saturday in the story.” 
  If the child stopped before the end of the story, the 
experimenter said, “Tell me more” or ask “What happened next?” 
 Cued recall. 
 For each story detail the child did not provide during Free 
Recall, the experimenter asked the Cued Recall question provided on the Record 
form. 
  For example, if the child did not say the boy’s name then the 
experimenter asked “What was the boy’s name?” 
 Recognition. 
The experimenter read each Recognition question to the child 
from the Record Form, even if the child gave the correct responses to the Cued Recall 
questions. 
5-10-year-old task. 
 “I am going to read a story to you about a boy and his sister.” 
 “Jim had a big, black dog named Pepper. By Jim’s house was a tall 
tree with branches that he couldn’t reach. One day Jim got a ladder and climbed up. 
Pepper watched Jim as he sat on a branch and looked out over his neighborhood. 
When he started to get down, his foot slipped, his shoe fell off, and the ladder fell 
down. Jim didn’t fall, because he held onto a branch, but he couldn’t get down. 
Suddenly Pepper ran away with Jim’s shoe in his mouth. Jim was sad because Pepper 
didn’t stay with him. Pepper took the shoe to Anna, Jim’s sister. He barked and 




barked. Then Anna understood that Jim was in trouble. She followed Pepper to the 
tree and rescued Jim.” 
 Free recall. 
 “Now tell me everything you can remember from the story and 
start from the beginning.” 
  If child had difficulty getting started, the experimenter asked, 
“How did the story start?”  
  If the child did not respond, the experimenter said, “Just tell 
me anything you can remember from the story.” 
  If the child stopped before the end of the story, the 
experimenter said, “Tell me more” or ask “What happened next?” 
 Cued recall. 
 For each story detail the child did not provide during Free 
Recall, the experimenter asked the Cued Recall question provided on the Record 
form. 
  For example, if the child did not say the boy’s name the 
experimenter asked “What was the boy’s name?” 
 Recognition. 
 The experimenter read each Recognition question to the child 
from the Record Form, even if the child gave the correct responses to the Cued Recall 
questions. 
Scoring 




Scoring occurred during task administration. The child received 2 points for 
each detail correctly recalled during Free Recall. The child received 1 point for each 
detail for recalled during Free Recall. Free and Cued Recall was combined score on 
the Free and Cued Recall sections. The child receives 1 point for each detail 
remembered during Recognition.  
Dependent Measures 
 Free Recall, Free and Cued Recall, and Recognition percentages were 
calculated. 
Appendix E 
Day/Night Task Protocol 
Procedure References 
Gerstadt, C. L., Hong.Y. J.,  & Diamond, A. (1994). The relationship between 
cognition and action: performance of children 3.5-7 years old on Stroop-like 
day-night test. Cognition. 53, 129-153. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(94)90068-X 
Passler, P. A., Isaac, W., & Hynd, G. W. (1985). Neuropsychological development of 
behavior attributed to frontal lobe functioning in children. Developmental 
Neuropsychology, 4, 349-370. doi:10.1080/87565648509540320 
Materials 
 Two 8.5” x 11” stimuli were used for task administration. One stimulus 
showed a white moon and stars on a dark blue background and the other showed a 
yellow sun on a white background (see Figure 1).  
Task Preparation 








The experimenter verified that the child understood the picture 
representation. By asking “Which one is day?” and “Which one is night?” 
 Task instructions. 
 “Now we are going to do something different. When I say ‘day’ point 
to this one [point to the night card]. When I say ‘night’ point to this one [point to the 
day card].” 
 Practice. 
 “Now you try.”  
 “Day” 
 If child answers incorrectly, the experimenter repeated the instructions 
and redid this trial. 
 If child answers correctly, the experimenter said “Good job!” and 
continued to next trial. 
 “Night” 
 If child answered incorrectly, the experimenter repeated the 
instructions  
 If child answers correctly, the experimenter said “Good job!” and 
continue to test trials. 
Test.  





















Scoring occurred after task administration from video by undergraduate 
research assistants. Accuracy was assessed by summing correct responses. Mean 
response latency was assessed from the time the experimenter provides the “Day” or 
“Night” prompts to when the child points to the chosen stimulus.  
Dependent Measures 
 Only original response accuracy was examined for the present report.  





Delay of Gratification Task 
Materials 
 Materials included a stopwatch, dessert plates, mini marshmallows, goldfish 
crackers, and M&M’s.  
Task 
 Instructions. 
 The experimenter brought the child into the testing suite.  
“Would you rather have marshmallows, goldfish, or M&M’s?” 
 The experimenter placed 2 of the chosen item on one plate and 
10 of the chosen item on another plate.  
“Would you rather have this many [the experimenter pointed to plate 
of with 2 snacks] or this many [the experimenter pointed to plate of 10 snacks]?” 
“I have to go out of the room for a little while. If you wait until I come back 
you can eat these [point to preferred reward]. Or you can eat these [point to 
unpreferred reward] and I will come right back. But if you eat these [point to 
unpreferred reward] then you can’t have these [point to preferred reward].”  
Comprehension check. 
“What will happen if you wait for me to come back?”  
“Remember, stay in your chair.”  
 Task. 




Then, the experimenter left the room and watched the child on the video. The 
experimenter waited 5 minutes. If the child ate the reward, the experimenter entered 
the room and the task was over.  
 “Did I tell you I would give you another one?”  
Scoring 
Scoring occurred during task administration. The experimenter began the 
timer when the testing suite door was closed. The task was scored for whether or not 
the child ate the snack, and, if the child ate the snack, how the length of time the child 
waited.  
Dependent Measures 
 Only the dichotomous variable for delaying gratification or failing to do so 
was used in the present analyses.  
 







 Numbered lists were obtained from the Woodcock-Johnson III Numbers 
Reversed Task. The first three exemplars for each digit length were chosen to form 
four lists each ranging from 2-7 digits. 
Task 
 Instructions. 
  “I am going to say some numbers. Then, I want you to say the same 
numbers. For example, if I say 3…4, you would say 3…4.” 
  “This time you tell me the numbers: 6…8 (spoken at one digit per 
second).” 
  If necessary, the experimenter additional pairs of digits from the 
following list until the child understood the task: “2…8,”“6…1,”“3…6” 
 Test items. 
  If children correctly recalled the digits for 3 out of 4 lists, they 
advanced to the next level. If this criterion was not reached, the task ended. 
  “Ready? Remember to tell me the numbers.” 
  Two digits: 
   L1: “2…5” 
   L2: “9…3” 
   L3: “4…7” 




   L4: “1…6” 
“I am going to say three numbers. Ready? Remember to tell me the 
numbers.” 
Three digits: 
 L1: “7…3…6” 
 L2: “3…9…4” 
 L3: “8…1…6” 
 L4: “5…9…2” 
“I am going to say four numbers. Ready? Remember to tell me the 
numbers.” 
 L1: “9…3…6…1” 
 L2: “8…5…2…6” 
 L3: “4…7…3…1” 
 L4: “3…6…2…9” 
“I am going to say five numbers. Ready? Remember to tell me the 
numbers.” 
 L1: “5…9…2…4…7” 
 L2: “1…6…4…8…5” 
 L3: “5…2…8…3…7” 
 L4: “8…4…1…6…9” 
“I am going to say six numbers. Ready? Remember to tell me the 
numbers.” 
 L1: “2…5…9…3…7…4” 




 L2: “7…3…6…1…5…2” 
 L3: “2…6…8…5…9…4” 
 L4: “3…9…4…2…7…1” 
“I am going to say seven numbers. Ready? Remember to tell me the 
numbers.” 
 L1: “8…1…6…3…7…8…5” 
 L2: “9…3…6…1…7…5…8” 
 L3: “6…3…1…8…4…7…2” 
 L4: “1…8…3...6…9…2…5” 
Scoring 
 Scoring occurred during task administration. 
Dependent Measure 
 The dependent measure was the total number of digit sequences the child 
recalled. 





Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) Task Protocol 
Procedure Reference 
Zelazo, P. (2006). The DCCS: A method of assessing executive function in 
children. Nature Protocols, 1 (1), 297-302 
Materials 
 Materials included 2 4” x 2.75” targets cards (i.e., blue rabbit and red boat), 
21 4” x 2.75 test cards (i.e., 7 red rabbit cards, 7 blue boat cards, 4 bordered red rabbit 
cards, 3 bordered blue boat cards), and two wooden sorting apparatuses (see Figure 
X).  
Task Preparation 
A spreadsheet was used to counterbalance sheet which dimension was 
relevant during the pre-switch phase across participants. The experimenter placed the 
blue rabbit and the red boat target cards above the left and right card sorting trays, 
respectively.  
Task 
The experimenter labeled the target cards by both dimensions. “Here’s a blue 
rabbit and here’s a red boat.” 
Beginning with color game.  
Instructions.  




 “We are going to play a card game. This is the color game. In the 
color game, all the blue ones go here [pointing to the tray on the left], and all the red 
ones go there [pointing to the tray on the right].”  
 The experimenter sorted one type of test card (e.g. a blue boat) 
by color, and then said, “See, here’s a blue one. So it goes here [place it face down in 
the tray on the left].” Then, the experimenter repeated the pre-switch rules, “If it’s 
blue it goes here, but if it’s red it goes there.” 
 The experimenter showed the child the other type of test card 
(e.g., a red rabbit), and say, “Now here’s a red one. Where does this one go?”  
 If the child sorted it correctly or indicated the correct tray by 
pointing the experimenter said, “Very good. You know how to play the color game.”  
  If the child pointed, the experimenter said, “Can you 
help me put this one down?” The experimenter ensured the card was face down in the 
appropriate tray, turning the card if necessary. 
  If incorrect, the experimenter said “No, this one’s red, 
so it has to go over here in the color game. Can you help me put this red one down?” 
  Pre-switch phase. 
 “Now it’s your turn. So remember, if it’s blue it goes here, but 
if it’s red it goes there.” 
The experimenter randomly selected a test card, showed it to 
the child, and labeled it by the relevant dimension only.  
“Here’s a red/blue one. Where does it go?” 
If the child pointed, the experimenter could sort it for him/her. 




“Let’s do another one.” or “Let’s do it again.” or “How about 
another one?” 
The experimenter was neutral, non-evaluative, and non-
corrective (e.g. do not say, “Okay”). 
The experimenter ensured that the same type of test card was 
not selected on more than 2 consecutive trials. 
The experimenter repeaed the pre-switch rules. “Play the color 
game: If it’s blue it goes here, but if it’s red it goes there. Here’s a red/blue one. 
Where does it go?” or “Here’s a red/blue one, where does this one go?” 
  Post-switch shape game. 
    “Now we’re going to play a new game. We’re not going to 
play the color game anymore. We’re going to play the shape game. In the shape 
game, all the rabbits go here [pointing to the tray on the left], and all the boats go 
there [pointing to the tray on the right]. Remember, if it’s a rabbit, put it here, but if 
it’s a boat, put it there. Okay?” 
The experimenter randomly selected a test card, showed it to 
the child, and labeled it by the relevant dimension only.  
“Here’s a rabbit/boat one. Where does it go?” 
If the child pointed, the experimenter sorted it for them. 
“Let’s do another one.” or “Let’s do it again.” or “How 
about another one?” 
The experimenter was neutral, non-evaluative, and non-
corrective (e.g. do not say, “Okay”). 




The experimenter ensured that the same type of test card was 
not selected on more than 2 consecutive trials. 
The experimenter repeated the post-switch rules. “Play the 
shape game: If it’s a rabbit it goes here, but if it’s a boat it goes there. Here’s a 
rabbit/boat one. Where does it go”? or “Here’s a rabbit/boat one, where does this 
one go?” 
 The same instructions were used when children performed the shape game 
first.  
 Criteria for border version. 
  If the child accurately sorted at least 5 cards correctly, they continued 
to the border version. 
 Border version. 
  Task preparation. 
   The experimenter collected all the cards from the trays. The 
experimenter selected 4 red rabbits and 3 blue boats, and combined these with the 
border cards (four red rabbits and three blue boats). 
  “Okay, you played really well. Now I have a more difficult game for 
you to play. In this game, you sometimes get cards that have a black border around it 
like this one [show a red rabbit with a border]. If you see cards with a black border, 
you have to play the color game. In the color game, red ones go here and blue ones 
go there [pointing to the appropriate trays]. This card’s red, so I’m going to put it 
right there [placing it face down in the appropriate tray].  




But if the cards have no black border, like this one [show them a red rabbit without a 
border], you have to play the shape game. In the shape game, if it’s a red rabbit we 
put it here, but if it’s a boat, we put it there [pointing to the appropriate trays]. This 
one’s a rabbit, so I’m going to put it right here [placing it face down in the 
appropriate tray]. Okay? Now it’s your turn.” 
This procedure continued for 12 trials. 
“Remember, if there’s a black border, you have to play the color 
game. But if there’s no black border, you have to play the shape game.” 
The experimenter selected a test card. 
“Here’s one with/without a black border. Where does it go?” 
“Let’s do another one.” or “Let’s do it again.” or “How about 
another one?” 
The experimenter was neutral, non-evaluative, and non-corrective 
(e.g. do not say, “Okay”). 
 Troubleshooting. 
Hesitation. 
 The experimenter propmpted the child again (e.g. “Here’s a 
_______, where does it go?” 
 If the child was still hesitant, the experimenter said “Let’s do 
another one” and come back to the card later. 
Refusal. 
 “You can point to the box” 
 If the child still refused, the task was terminated. 





 The child was allowed to change responses, but only the final 
response was recorded. Then, the experimenter said “Are you sure?” then went to 
next trial. 
Desire feedback. 
 The child was never given feedback.  
 “Sort the card” or “Let’s do another one” 
Pick up cards in tray. 
 “Those cards have to stay there, but let’s do another one” 
Want a break. 
 Breaks were discouraged by saying “We’re almost done.” 
 If child had to have a break, the interrupted step was repeated 
and the task completed.  
Scoring 
Scoring occurred after task administration from video by undergraduate 
research assistants. Accuracy was assessed by summing correct responses and by 
assessing the length of time between when the child was handed the card and when 
the child sorted it to the final response bin. 
Dependent Measure 
 Accuracy summed across the standard and bordered versions was the only 
dependent measure used for the current study.  





Alexander, M. P., Stuss, D. T., & Fansabedian, N. (2003). California Verbal Learning 
Test: Performance by patients with focal frontal and non-frontal lesions. 
Brain, 126, 1493-1503. doi:10.1093/brain/awg128 
Baker-Ward, L., Gordon, B. N., Ornstein, P. A., Larus, D. M., & Clubb, P. A. (1993). 
Young children’s long-term retention of a pediatric examination. Child 
Development, 64, 1519-1533. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.1993.tb02968.x 
Baker-Ward, L., Hess, T. M., Flannagan, D. A. (1990). The effects of involvement on 
children’s memory for events. Cognitive Development, 5(1), 55-69. 
doi:10.1016/0885-2014(90)90012-I 
Bauer, P. J. (2004). Getting explicit memory off the ground: Steps toward 
construction of a neuro-developmental account of changes in the first two 
years of life. Developmental Review, 24, 347-373. 
doi:10.1016/j.dr.2004.08.003 
Bauer, P. J. (2006). Event memory. In D. Kuhn & R. Siegler (Volume Editors: 
Volume 2-Cognition, Perception, and Language), W. Damon & R. M. Lerner 
(Editors-in-Chief). Handbook of Child Psychology, Sixth Edition (pp. 373-
425). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Berlin, H. A., Rolls, E. T., & Kischka, U. (2004). Impulsivity, time perception, 
emotion, and reinforcement sensitivity in patients with orbitofrontal cortex 
lesions. Brain, 127(5), 1108-1126. doi:10.1093/brain/awh135 




Best, J. R., Miller, P. H., & Jones, L. L. (2009). Executive functions after age 5: 
Changes and correlates. Developmental Review, 29, 180-200. 
doi:10.1016/j.dr.2009.05.002 
Bright-Paul, A., Jarrold, C., & Wright, D. B. (2008). Theory-of-mind development 
influences suggestibility and source monitoring. Developmental Psychology, 
44(4), 1055-1068. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.44.4.1055 
Bugaiska, A., Clarys, D., Jarry, C., Taconnat, L., Tapia G., Vaneste S., & Isingrini, 
M. (2007). The effect of aging in recollective experience: The processing 
speed and executive functioning hypothesis. Consciousness and Cognition, 
16, 797-808. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2006.11.007 
Cabeza, R., & Nyberg, L. (2000). Imaging cognition II: An empirical review of 275 
PET and fMRI studies. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12(1), 1-47. 
doi:10.1162/08989290051137585 
Cansino, S., Maquet, P., Dolan, R. J., & Rugg, M. D. (2002). Brain activity 
underlying encoding and retrieval of source memory. Cerebral Cortex, 12, 
1048-1056. doi:10.1093/cercor/12.10.1048 
Carlson, S. M. (2005). Developmentally sensitive measures of executive function in 
preschool children. Developmental neuropsychology, 28(2), 595-616. 
doi:10.1207/s15326942dn2802_3 
Carlson, S. M., & Moses, L. J. (2001). Individual differences in inhibitory control and 
children’s theory of mind. Child Development, 72(4), 1032-1053. 
doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00333 




Casey, B. J., Tottenham, N., Liston, C., & Durston, S. (2005). Imaging the developing 
brain: what have we learned about cognitive development? TRENDS in 
Cognitive Sciences, 9(3), 104-110. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.01.011 
Cohen, J., & Cohen, P. (1983). Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for 
behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Craik, F. I. M., Morris, L. W., Morris, R. G., & Loewen, E. R. (1990). Relations 
between source amnesia and frontal lobe functioning in older adults. 
Psychology and Aging, 5(1), 148-151. doi:10.1037//0882-7974.5.1.148 
Crammond, J. (1992). Analyzing the basic cognitive developmental processes of 
children with specific types of learning disability. In R. Case (Ed.), The 
mind’s staircase: Exploring the conceptual underpinnings of human thought 
and knowledge (pp. 285-303). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Cycowicz, Y. M., Friedman, D., Snodgrass, J. G., & Duff, M. (2001). Recognition 
and source memory for pictures in children and adults. Neuropsychologia, 39, 
255–267. doi:10.1016/S0028-3932(00)00108-1 
de Haan, M., & Johnson, M. H. (2003). Introduction. In M. de Haan and M. H. 
Johnson (Eds.) The cognitive neuroscience of development (xv-xx). New 
York: Psychology Press.  
 Diamond, A. (2002). Normal development of prefrontal cortex from birth to young 
adulthood: Cognitive functions, anatomy, and biochemistry. In D. T. Stuss & 
R. T. Knight (Eds.), Principles of frontal lobe function (pp. 466-503). London, 
UK: Oxford University Press. 




Diamond, A. (2006). The early development of executive functions. In E. Bialystok 
& F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), Lifespan cognition: Mechanisms of change (pp. 70-
95). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Diamond, A., & Boyer, K. (1988). A version of the WCST for use with preschool 
children, and an exploration of their errors. Journal of Clinical and 
Experimental Neuropsychology, 11, 832. 
Diana, R. A., Van den Boom, W., Yonelinas, A. P., & Ranganath, C. (2011). ERP 
correlates of source memory: Unitized source information increases 
familiarity-based retrieval. Brain Research, 1367, 278-386. 
doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2010.10.030 
Diana, R. A., Yonelinas, A. P., & Ranganath, C. (2007). Imaging recollection and 
familiarity in the medial temporal lobe: A three-component model. Trends in 
Cognitive Science, 11(9), 379-386. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2007.08.001 
Diana, R. A., Yonelinas, A. P., & Ranganath, C. (2009). Medial temporal lobe 
activity during source retrieval reflects information types, not memory 
strength. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22(8), 1808-1818. 
doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21335 
Diana, R. A., Yonelinas, A. P., & Ranganath, C. (2010). Medial temporal lobe 
activity during source retrieval reflects information type, not memory 
strength. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22(8), 1808-1818. 
doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21335 




Dobbins, I. G., Foley, H., Schacter, D. L., & Wagner, A. D. (2002). Executive control 
during episodic retrieval: Multiple prefrontal processes subserve source 
memory. Neuron, 35, 989-996. doi:10.1016/S0896-6273(02)00858-9 
Dobbins, I. G., Simons, J. S., & Schacter, D. L. (2004). fMRI evidence for separable 
and lateralized prefrontal memory monitoring processes. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 16(6), 908-920. doi:10.1162/0898929041502751 
Drummey, A. B., & Newcombe, N. S. (2002). Developmental changes in source 
memory. Developmental Science, 5(4), 502-513. doi:10.1111/1467-
7687.00243 
Duarte, A., Ranganath, C., & Knight, R. T. (2005). Effects of unilateral prefrontal 
lesions on familiarity, recollection, and source memory. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 25(36), 8333-8337. doi:10.1523/jneurosci.1392-05.2005 
Eckenhoff, M., & Rakic, P. (1991). A quantitative analysis of synaptogenesis in the 
molecular layer of the dentate gyrus in the rhesus monkey. Developmental 
Brain Research, 64, 129–135. doi:10.1016/0165-3806(91)90216-6 
Eichenbaum, H., Yonelinas, A. P., & Ranganath, C. (2007). The medial temporal lobe 
and recognition memory. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 30, 123-152. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.30.051606.094328 
Engelkamp, J. (1998). Memory for actions. Sussex: Psychology Press. 
Fabiani, M., & Friedman, D. (1996). Dissociations between memory for temporal 
order and recognition memory in aging. Neuropsychologia, 35(2), 129-141. 
doi:10.1016/S0028-3932(96)00073-5 




Farovik, A., Dupont, L. M., Arce, M., & Eichenbaum, H. (2008). Medial prefrontal 
cortex supports recollection, but not familiarity, in the rat. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 28(50), 13428-13434. doi:10.1523/jneurosci.3662-08.2008 
Frisk, V., & Milner, B. (1990). The role of the left hippocampal region in the 
acquisition and retention of story content. Neuropsychologia, 28(4), 349-359. 
doi:10.1016/0028-3932(90)90061-R 
Gabrieli, J. D. E., Cohen, N. J., & Corkin, S. (1988). The impaired learning of 
semantic knowledge following bilateral medial temporal-lobe resection. Brain 
and Cognition, 7(2), 157-177. doi:10.1016/0278-2626(88)90027-9 
Garoff-Eaton, R. J., Slotnick, S. D., & Schacter, D. L. (2005). Not all false memories 
are created equal: The neural basis of false recognition. Cerebral Cortex, 16, 
1645-1652. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhj101 
Garon, N., Bryson, S. E., & Smith, I. M. (2008). Executive function in preschoolers: 
A review using an integrative framework. Psychological Bulletin, 134(1), 31-
60.  doi:10.1037/0033-2909.134.1.31 
Gathercole, S. E., & Adams, A. (1993). Phonological working memory in very young 
children. Developmental Psychology, 29(4), 770-778. doi:10.1037//0012-
1649.29.4.770 
Gerstadt, C. L., Hong, Y. J., & Diamond, A. (1994). The relationship between 
cognition and action: Performance of children 3 1/2–7 years old on a Stroop-
like day-night test. Cognition, 53, 129-153. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(94)90068-
X 




Ghetti, S., DeMaster, D. M., Yonelinas, A. P., & Bunge, S. A. (2010). Developmental 
differences in medial temporal lobe function during memory encoding. The 
Journal of Neuroscience, 30(28), 9548-9556. doi:10.1523/jneurosci.3500-
09.201 
Giedd, J. N., Blumenthal, J., Jeffries, N. O., Castellanos, F. X., Liu, H., Zijdenbos, A., 
Paus, T…. Rapoport, J. L. (1999). Brain development during childhood and 
adolescence: a longitudinal MRI study. Nature Neuroscience, 2(10), 861-863. 
Glisky, E. L., Polster, M. R., & Routhieux, B. C. (1995). Double dissociation between 
item and source memory. Neuropsychology, 9(2), 229-235. 
doi:10.1037//0894-4105.9.2.229 
Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1987). Circuitry of primate prefrontal cortex and regulation of 
behavior by representational memory. In F. Plum (Ed.), Handbook of 
physiology, the nervous system, higher functions of the brain (Vol. 5, pp. 373–
417). Bethesda, MD: American Physiological Society. 
Gopnik, A., & Rosati, A. (2001). Duck or rabbit? Reversing ambiguous figures and 
understanding ambiguous representations. Developmental Science, 4, 175-
193. doi:10.1111/1467-7687.00163 
Hamond, N. R., & Fivush, R. (1991). Memories of Mickey Mouse: Young children 
recount their trip to Disney World. Cognitive Development, 6, 433–448. 
doi:10.1016/0885-2014(91)90048-I 
Hayes, A. F., & Krippendorff, K. (2007). Answering the call for a standard reliability 
measure for coding data. Communication Methods and Measures, 1(1), 77-89. 
doi:10.1080/19312450709336664 




Herlitz, A., & Yonker, J. E. (2002). Sex differences in episodic memory: The 
influence of intelligence. Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Neuropsychology, 24(1), 107-114. doi:10.1076/jcen.24.1.107.970 
Hongwanishkul, D., Happaney, K. R., Lee, W. S. C., & Zelazo, P. D. (2005). 
Assessment of hot and cool executive function in young children: Age-related 
changes in individual differences. Developmental Neuropsychology, 28(2), 
617-644. doi:10.1207/s15326942dn2802_4 
Houck, G. M., & Lecuyer-Maus, E. A. (2004). Maternal limit setting during 
toddlerhood, delay of gratification, and behavior problems at age five. Infant 
Mental Health Journal, 25(1), 28-46. doi:10.1002/imhj.10083 
Huttenlocher, P. R. (1990). Morphometric study of human cerebral cortex 
development.  
Ingvar, D. H., & Philipsson, L. (1977). Distribution of cerebral blood flow in the 
dominant hemisphere during motor ideation and motor performance. Annals 
of Neurology, 2, 230-237. doi:10.1002/ana.410020309 
Janowsky, J. S., Shimamura, A. P., & Squire, L. R. (1989). Source memory 
impairment inpatients with frontal lobe lesions. Neuropsychologia, 27(8), 
1043-1056.  doi:10.1016/0028-3932(89)90184-X 
Jurado, M. A., Junque, C., Pujol, J., Oliver, B., & Vendrell, P. (1997). Impaired 
estimation of word occurrence frequency in frontal lobe patients. 
Neuropsychologia, 35(5), 635-641. 
Kirwan, C. B., Wixted, J. T., & Squire, L. R. (2008). Activity in the medial temporal 
lobe predicts memory strength, whereas activity in the prefrontal cortex 




predicts recollection. The Journal of Neuroscience, 28(42), 10541-10548.  
doi:10.1523/jneurosci.3456-08.2008 
Kopelman, M. D., Stanhope, N., & Kingsley, D. (1997). Temporal and spatial context 
memory in patients with focal frontal, temporal lobe, and diencephalic lesions. 
Neuropsychologia, 35(12), 1533-1545. doi:10.1016/S0028-3932(97)00076-6 
Korkman, M., Kirk, U., & Kemp, S. L. (2007). NEPSY II. Clinical and Interpretative 
Manual. Psychological Corporation, San Antonio, TX. 
Larkina, M., & Bauer, P. J. (2011, March). Comparing the Distributions of 
Autobiographical Memories of Children and Adults Using a Cue-Word 
Technique. Poster session presented at the Bienniel Meeting of the Society for 
Research in Child Development, Montreal, QC. 
Lindsay, D. S., Johnson, M. K., & Kwon, P. (1991). Developmental changes in 
source monitoring. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 53(3), 297-318. 
doi:10.1016/0022-0965(91)90065-Z 
Lloyd, M. E., Doydum, A. O., & Newcombe, N. S. (2009). Memory binding in early 
childhood: Evidence for a retrieval deficit. Child Development, 80(5), 1321-
1328. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01353.x 
Luciana, M., & Nelson, C. A. (2002). Assessment of neuropsychological function 
through use of the Cambridge Neuropsychological Testing Automated 
Battery: Performance in 4- to 12-year-old children. Developmental 
Neuropsychology, 22(3), 595-624. doi:10.1207/S15326942DN2203_3 
Lukowski, A. F., Wiebe, S. A., Haight, J. C., DeBoer, T., Nelson, C. A., & Bauer, P. 
J. (2005). Forming a stable memory representation in the first year of life: 




Why imitation is more than child’s play. Developmental Science, 8(3), 279-
298. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2005.00415.x 
Manning, K. J., Gordon, B., Pearlson, G. D., & Schretlen, D. J. (2007).  The 
relationship of recency discrimination to explicit memory and executive 
functioning. Journal of International Neuropsychological Society, 13(4), 710-
715. doi:10.1017/S1355617707070919 
Marshall, D. H., Drummey, A. B., Fox, N. A., & Newcombe, N. S. (2002). An event-
related potential study of item recognition memory in children and adults. 
Journal of Cognition and Development, 3(2), 201-224. 
doi:10.1207/S15327647JCD0302_4 
McCabe, D. P., Roediger, H. L., III., McDaniel, M. A., & Balota, D. A. (2009). 
Aging reduces veridical remembering but increases false remembering: 
Neuropsychological test correlates of remember-know judgments. 
Neuropsychologia, 47, 2164-2173. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.11.025 
McIntyre, J. S., & Craik, F. I. M. (1987). Age differences in memory for item and 
source information. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 41(2), 175-192. 
doi:10.1037/h0084154 
Melinder, A., Endestad, T., & Magnussen, S. (2006). Relations between episodic 
memory, suggestibility, theory of mind, and conflict inhibition in the 
preschool child. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 47, 485-495. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9450.2006.00542.x 




Menna, R. (1989). Working memory and development: An EEG investigation. 
Toronto: University of Toronto.  
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M. L. (1989). Delay of gratification in 
children. Science, 244, 933-938. doi:10.1126/science.2658056 
Mischel, W., & Ebbesen, E. B. (1970). Attention in delay of gratification. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 16(2), 329-337. doi:10.1037/h0029815 
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., & 
Wagner, T. D. (2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their 
contributions to complex “frontal lobe” tasks: A latent variable analysis. 
Cognitive Psychology, 41, 49-100. doi:10.1006/cogp.1999.0734 
Morgan, A.B., & Lilienfeld, S.O. (2000). A meta-analytic review of the relation 
between antisocial behavior and neuropsychological measures of executive 
functioning. Clinical Psychology Review, 20, 113-136. doi:10.1016/S0272-
7358(98)00096-8 
Norman, K. A., & Schacter, D. L. (1997). False recognition in younger and older 
adults: Exploring the characteristics of illusory memories. Memory & 
Cognition, 25, 838-848. doi:10.3758/BF03211328 
Nyberg, L., Petersson, K. M., Nilsson, L., Sandblom, J., Aberg, C., Ingvar, M. (2001). 
Reactivation of motor areas during explicit memory for actions. NeuroImage, 
14, 521-528. doi:10.1006/nimg.2001.0801 
Ofen, N., Kao, Y., Sokol-Hessner, P., Kim, H., Whitfield-Gabrieli, S., & Gabrieli, J. 
D. E. (2007). Development of the declarative memory system in the human 
brain. Nature Neuroscience, 10, 1198-1205. doi:10.1038/nn1950 




O’Sullivan, M., Jones, D. K., Summers, P. E., Morris, R. G., Williams, S. C. R., & 
Markus, H. S. (2001). Evidence for cortical “disconnection” as a mechanism 
of age-related cognitive decline. Neurology, 57, 632-638. 
Parkin, A. J., Walter, B. M., & Hunkin, N. M. (1995). Relationships between normal 
aging, frontal lobe function, and memory for temporal and spatial information. 
Neuropsychology, 9(3), 304-312. doi:10.1037/0894-4105.9.3.304 
Passler, P. A., Isaac, W., & Hynd, G. W. (1985). Neuropsychological development of 
behavior attributed to frontal lobe functioning in children. Developmental 
Neuropsychology, 4, 349-370. doi:10.1080/87565648509540320 
Perner, J., Leekam, S. R., & Wimmer, H. (1987). Three-year-olds’ difficulty with 
false belief: The case for a conceptual deficit. British Journal of 
Developmental Psychology, 5, 125-137. 
Peterson, C., & Rideout, R. (1998). Memory for medical emergencies experienced by 
1- and 2-year-olds. Developmental Psychology, 34(5), 1059-1072. 
doi:10.1037//0012-1649.34.5.1059 
Picard, L., Cousin, S. Guillery-Girard, B., Eustache, F., & Piolino, P. (2012). How do 
the different components of episodic memory develop? Role of executive 
functions and short-term feature binding abilities. Child Development, 83(3), 
1037-1050. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01736.x 
Picard, L., Reffuveille, I., Eustache, F., & Piolino, P. (2009). Development of 
autonoetic autobiographical memory in school-aged children: Genuine age 
effect or development of basic cognitive abilities? Consciousness and 
Cognition, 18, 864-876. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.07.008 




Pillemer, D. B., Picariello, M. L., & Pruett, J. C. (1997). Very long-term memories of 
a salient preschool event. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 8, 95-106. 
doi:10.1002/acp.2350080202 
Raz, N., Gunning, F. M., Head, D., Dupuis, J. H., McQuain, J., Briggs, S. D., … 
Acker, J. D. (1997). Selective aging of the human cerebral cortex observed in 
vivo: Differential vulnerability of the prefrontal gray matter. Cerebral Cortex, 
7, 268-282. doi:10.1093/cercor/7.3.268 
Riggins, T., Miller, N. C., Bauer, P. J., Georgieff, M. K., & Nelson, C. A. (2009). 
Electrophysiological indices of memory for temporal order in early childhood: 
Implications for the development of recollection. Developmental Science, 
12(2), 209-219. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00757.x 
Roberts, K. P., & Powell, M. B. (2005). The relation between inhibitory control and 
children’s eyewitness testimony. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 19, 1003-
1018. doi:10.1002/acp.1141 
Roland, R. E., Larsen, B., Lassen, N. A., Skinhoj, E. (1980). Supplementary motor 
area and other cortical areas in organization of voluntary movements in man. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 43, 118-136. 
Rossi, S., Cappa, S. F., Babiloni, C., Pasqualetti, P., Miniussi, C., Carducci, F., 
Babiloni, F., & Rossini, P. M. (2001). Prefrontal [correction of Prefontal] 
cortex in long-term memory: An ‘‘interference’’ approach using magnetic 
stimulation. Nature Neuroscience, 4, 948–952. doi:10.1038/nn1002-1017a 
Rotello, C. M., & Heit, E. (2000). Associative recognition: A case of recall-to-reject 
processing. Memory & Cognition, 29(6), 907-922. doi:10.3758/BF03209339 




Rubin, D. C., & Schulkind, M. D. (1997). The distribution of autobiographical 
memories across the lifespan. Memory & Cognition, 25(6), 859-866. 
doi:10.3758/BF03211330 
Ruffman, T., Rustin, C., Garnham, W., & Parkin, A. J. (2001). Source monitoring and 
false memories in children: Relation to certainty and executive functioning. 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 80, 95-111. 
doi:10.1006/jecp.2001.2632 
Schacter, D. J., Curran, T., Galluccio, L., Millberg, W. P., & Bates, J. F. (1996). False 
recognition and the right frontal lobe: A case study. Neuropsychologia, 34(8), 
793-808. doi:10.1016/0028-3932(95)00165-4 
Schacter, D. L., Norman, K. A., & Koutstaal, W. (1998). The cognitive neuroscience 
of constructive memory. Annual Review of Psychology, 49, 289-318. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.289 
Shimamura, A. P., Janowsky, J. S., & Squire, L. R. (1990). Memory for the temporal 
order of events in patients with frontal lobe lesions and amnesic patients. 
Neuropsychologia, 28(8), 803-813. doi:10.1016/0028-3932(90)90004-8 
Siegler, R., & Alibali, M. (2005). Memory development. In R. Siegler & M. Alibali 
(Eds.) Children’s thinking (pp. 226-267). Upper Saddle River: NJ: Prentice-
Hall. 
Slotnick, S. D., Moo, L. R., Segal, J. B., & Hart, J., Jr. (2003). Distinct prefrontal 
cortex activity associated with item memory and source memory for visual 
shapes. Cognitive Brain Research, 17, 75-82. doi:10.1016 /S0926-
6410(03)00082-X 




Sluzenski, J., Newcombe, N. S., & Kovacs, S. L. (2006). Binding, relational memory, 
and recall of naturalistic events: A developmental perspective. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 32(1), 89-100. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.32.1.89 
Spencer, W. D., & Raz, N. (1995). Differential effects of aging on memory for 
content and context: A meta-analysis. Psychology of Aging, 10(4), 527-539. 
doi:10.1037//0882-7974.10.4.527 
Suzuki, W. A., & Amaral, D. G. (1994). Perirhinal and parahippocampal cortices of 
the macaque monkey: Cortical afferents. The Journal of Comparative 
Neurology, 350, 497-533. doi:10.1002/cne.903500402 
Wagner, A. D., Desmond, J. E., Glover, G. H., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (1998). Prefrontal 
cortex and recognition memory: Functional-MRI evidence for context-
dependent retrieval processes. Brain, 121, 1985-2002. 
doi:10.1093/brain/121.10.1985 
Wechsler D. (2002).Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence - Third 
Edition (WPPSI-III). Psychological Corporation, San Antonio, TX. 
Welch-Ross, M. K., Diecidue, K., & Miller, S. A. (1997). Young children’s 
understanding of conflicting mental representations predicts suggestibility. 
Developmental Psychology,  33, 43-53. doi:10.1037//0012-1649.33.1.43 
Wiebe, S. A., Espy, K., Charak, D. (2008). Using confirmatory factor analysis to 
understand executive control in preschool children: I. Latent Structure. 
Developmental Psychology, 44(2), 575-587. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.44.2.575 




Yonelinas, A. P. (2002). The nature of recollection and familiarity: A review of 30 
years of research. Journal of Memory and Language, 46, 441-517. 
doi:10.1006/jmla.2002.2864 
Zelazo, P. D. (2006). The dimensional change card sort (DCCS): A method of 
assessing executive function in children. Nature Protocols, 1(1), 297-301. 
doi:10.1038/nprot.2006.46 
Zelazo, P. D., Carlson, S. M., & Kesek, A. (2008). The development of executive 
function in childhood. In C. Nelson & M. Luciana (Eds.), Handbook of 
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience (2nd ed.) (pp. 553-574). Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.  
Zelazo, P. D., & Jacques, S. (1997). Children’s rule use: Representation, reflection, 
and cognitive control. Annals of Child Development, 12, 119-176. 
Zelazo, P. D., Resnick, J. S., & Piñon, D. E. (1995). Response control and the 
execution of verbal rules. Developmental Psychology, 31, 508-517. 
doi:10.1037//0012-1649.31.3.508 
Zimmer, H. D., Cohen, R. L., Guynn, M. J., Engelkamp, J., Kormi-Nouri, R., & 
Foley, M. A. (2001) Memory for action: A distinct form of episodic memory? 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
